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Judging Immigration Equity: 
Deportation and Proportionality in 
the Supreme Court 
Jason A. Cade* 
Though it has not directly said so, the United States Supreme Court 
cares about proportionality in the deportation system. Or at least it thinks 
someone in the system should be considering the justifiability of removal 
decisions. As this Article demonstrates, the Court’s jurisprudence across a 
range of substantive and procedural challenges over the last fifteen years 
increases or preserves structural opportunities for equitable balancing at 
multiple levels in the deportation process. Notably, the Court has endorsed 
decision makers’ consideration of the normative justifiability of 
deportation even where noncitizens have a criminal history or lack a 
formal path to lawful status. This proportionality-based lens helps unify 
the Court’s seemingly disparate decisions regulating the immigration 
enforcement system in recent years. It also has implications for deferred 
action enforcement programs such as the DACA program implemented by 
President Obama in 2012. The Court’s general gravitation toward 
proportionality analysis in this field is sound. Nevertheless, there are 
drawbacks to the Court’s approach, and the cases are probably best seen 
as signals to the political branches that the deportation system remains in 
dire need of wide-ranging reform. 
 
 
 * Copyright © 2017 Jason A. Cade. Assistant Professor, University of Georgia 
Law School. For insightful comments at various stages of this project, I particularly 
thank Dan Coenen, Hiroshi Motomura, and Usha Rodrigues. I am also grateful to 
Muneer Ahmad, Jennifer Chacón, Nathan Chapman, Jennifer Koh, Kevin Lapp, Brian 
Lea, David Rubenstein, and participants at the Emerging Immigration Scholars 
Conference at the University of Miami Law School, the Clinical Law Writers 
Workshop at NYU Law School, and the UGA Law Junior Faculty Retreat. Adrian 
Pandev, “Joey” Wai Shan Fong, Olga Gambini, and Michael Sofo provided excellent 
research assistance. Thanks to Dean Peter “Bo” Rutledge and the University of Georgia 
for generous research support. 
  
1030 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:1029 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1031 
 I. HARSH LAW AND EQUITABLE DELEGATION ............................. 1036 
 II. STRUCTURING DEPORTATION DISCRETION IN THE MODERN 
SYSTEM ................................................................................... 1041 
A. Federal (Non-)Enforcement Discretion ............................ 1042 
B. Equitable Considerations in Cases Involving Criminal 
History ............................................................................ 1049 
1. Making Deals ............................................................ 1050 
2. Preserving Deals and Discretion .............................. 1060 
C. Arbitrary and Capricious Charging Discretion ................ 1071 
D. The Second-Look Cases ................................................... 1075 
E. Prolonged Detention ........................................................ 1082 
 III. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS ............................................ 1093 
A. Crime and Status ............................................................. 1095 
B. Categorical (Non-)Enforcement Discretion? .................... 1100 
C. Surrogates and Signals .................................................... 1103 
CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 1107 
 
  
  
2017] Judging Immigration Equity 1031 
“It’s because you give [the deportation statute] such a broad 
construction that you get the . . . unusual situation . . . that the 
State thinks it’s a very minor offense and yet it can become so 
significant that the person’s deported.” 
— Chief Justice John Roberts1 
“Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it 
makes sense to pursue removal at all. . . . Returning an alien to 
his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he 
has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria 
for admission.” 
— Justice Anthony Kennedy2 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 23, 2016, a deadlocked Supreme Court failed to reach a 
decision in United States v. Texas, which presented a challenge brought 
by twenty-six states to enjoin Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), an Obama 
administration program intended to extend discretionary deferral of 
removal to millions of undocumented residents in the United States.3 
The Court’s unsigned one-line opinion is without precedential effect 
but had the consequence of affirming the lower court judgment, which 
preliminarily enjoined the Obama initiative. The Court then denied 
the administration’s motion for rehearing before a full Supreme Court, 
returning the case to the district court for full consideration on the 
merits of the injunction.4 After the November 2016 election of Donald 
Trump, Department of Justice officials, together with lawyers for the 
twenty-six states, submitted a joint motion asking the district judge to 
 
 1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Mellouli v. Holder, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) 
(No. 13-1034), 2015 WL 2399380. 
 2 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 3 See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); see also United States v. 
Texas, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257 
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2016); RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DEFERRED ACTION 
FOR UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT PARENTS: ANALYSIS OF DAPA’S POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON 
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN 1 (2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deferred-
action-unauthorized-immigrant-parents-analysis-dapas-potential-effects-families 
(estimating that 3.3 million undocumented noncitizens might have benefited from 
DAPA, impacting 4.3 million children and 2.3 million other adults residing in the 
noncitizens’ households). 
 4 Petition for Rehearing, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-
674), 2016 WL 3902439, reh’g denied, 2016 WL 5640497 (Oct. 3, 2016). 
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stay the litigation until after the new administration determines how it 
wishes to proceed.5 It is anticipated that President-elect Trump will 
not pursue DAPA, and will also discontinue Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a similar executive policy implemented 
in 2012. As of this writing, however, related litigation continues to 
percolate in other Circuits.6 
Whether or not the Texas litigation continues, the initiatives at issue 
in that case raise fundamental questions about the scope of the 
executive branch’s discretionary authority to decline to enforce 
removal provisions against certain noncitizens whose mitigating 
equities have been determined to outweigh the gravity of their 
immigration offenses.7 Is it permissible (or desirable) for immigration 
officials to consider factors such as family connections, length of 
residence, and contributions to this country when making 
enforcement or removal decisions, even where code law provides the 
noncitizen no formal avenue for relief? Is it permissible (or desirable) 
for executive policy-makers to establish standards that mandate the 
exercise of equitable discretion, including when millions of deportable 
noncitizens might be able to satisfy them? Should the immigration 
status of the subject of potential enforcement be evaluated in 
 
 5 See Josh Gerstein, Citing Trump Win, Feds Move to Put Immigration Suit on Ice, 
POLITICO (Nov. 18, 2016). 
 6 See, e.g., Complaint, Vidal v. Baran, No. 1:16-cv-04756 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 
2016) (challenging nationwide scope of Judge Hanen’s preliminary injunction in the 
DACA/DAPA litigation); Complaint, Lopez v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-09670 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 12, 2016) (same). 
 7 To be sure, even if Texas or related litigation eventually reaches the Court again, 
the Justices might never reach the substantive questions at the heart of the case. The case 
raises thorny standing and procedural issues that offer courts a number of exit points. See, 
e.g., Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind Pres. 
Obama’s Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 693-94 (2016) (discussing whether 
the deferred action programs constitute binding rules requiring use of the Administrative 
Procedures Act’s notice and comment provisions); Anne Egeler, Symposium: Unable to 
Show Harm, Can Texas Employ the Court as a Political Referee?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 8, 
2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/symposium-unable-to-show-harm-can-texas-
employ-the-court-as-a-political-referee/ (discussing standing issues in the case); Marty 
Lederman, Two More Reasons Why the “Take Care” Argument in the DAPA Case Is a Non-
Issue, BALKANIZATION (Jan. 20, 2016, 1:47 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/01/two-
more-reasons-why-take-care-argument.html (explaining why the Court was unlikely to 
reach the constitutional question in the case no matter which side prevails); Leticia 
Saucedo, On-Line Symposium on Texas v. United States: Employment Authorization, the 
DAPA Memo and the Fifth Circuit’s Opinion, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Nov. 15, 2015), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/11/in-line-symposium-on-texas- 
v-united-states-employment-authorization-the-dapa-memo-and-the-fifth-circ.html 
(discussing the intersection between DAPA and preexisting regulations permitting grants 
of employment authorization to persons with deferred action).  
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discretionary decisions? These are complex concerns about the 
salience and scope of equity and proportionality in the context of the 
modern day deportation system. Such concerns are of vital importance 
to policy-makers, jurists, and advocates as the nation continues to 
grapple with contentious immigration issues. 
Texas was by no means the only case to reach the Court in recent 
years implicating the proportionality of the deportation system. 
Indeed, this Article aims to show that the Court has become 
increasingly troubled by the harsh and inflexible deportation rules 
enacted by Congress in the 1990s. Across a range of procedural and 
substantive law, the Court has issued decisions that endeavor to 
structure the exercise of deportation discretion in both criminal and 
administrative courts, in ways that encourage the possibility of 
equitable balancing and that constrain some of the most onerous 
applications of criminal removal provisions. What appears to underlie 
this jurisprudence, though never explicitly acknowledged by the 
Court, is a proportionality norm. The Court has not purported to 
engage in substantive proportionality review, and its decisions do not 
expressly make use of the term proportionality.8 But its procedural 
and structural rulings in this area unmistakably promote consideration 
of noncitizens’ mitigating characteristics before the life-altering 
sanction of deportation is imposed. This Article looks at the Court’s 
deportation rulings holistically, drawing attention to the common 
themes in this emerging proportionality-influenced jurisprudence as 
well as the limitations of the Court’s approach. 
Part I of the Article offers a brief overview of changes made to the 
immigration code in the 1990s, thus providing necessary context for 
recent executive actions and Court decisions in this area. Part II turns 
to those decisions. First, Part II.A explains how in Arizona v. United 
States9 the Court came to grips with the critical role that prosecutorial 
discretion plays in setting deportation policy. As the Court 
acknowledged, enforcement choices, rather than adjudicative 
decisions by immigration judges, are now the primary locus of 
decisions about priorities and fairness in the administration of 
deportation rules.10 Significantly, the Court tied much of its analysis in 
 
 8 However, while the Court’s decisions primarily concern procedural rulings, 
several have a substantive effect, curbing the harshest applications of criminal removal 
statutes. See infra Parts II.B, III.B. 
 9 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 10 See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (acknowledging that 
prosecutorial discretion in criminal courts critically influences immigration court 
outcomes). 
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Arizona to a perceived need to protect executive decisions not to 
enforce immigration law against certain removable noncitizens from 
state interference. Viewing Arizona through the lens of proportionality 
helps to reconcile the Court’s separate preemption rulings in that case, 
and it does so in a way that may have an advantage over the Equal-
Protection-based rationale put forward by other commentators.11 
The remainder of Part II demonstrates that, while Arizona 
consolidated discretionary enforcement power in the federal 
government, another large body of the Court’s recent immigration 
decisions has limited and shaped executive authority in ways that 
promote the possibility that a noncitizen’s equities and infractions will 
be weighed before deportation is imposed. Part II.B explains how one 
set of decisions (most notably, Padilla v. Kentucky) increases 
opportunities for criminal court outcomes that account for the 
justifiability of deportation in individual cases, while the Court’s 
categorical approach rulings operate to preserve criminal court deals 
that benefit noncitizens in subsequent removal proceedings. Part II.C 
discusses Judulang v. Holder,12 a case that, while unusual, may presage 
further judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial charging practices in 
immigration court, at least to the extent that those decisions arbitrarily 
foreclose discretionary relief from removal. Part II.D turns to yet 
another group of decisions recognizing procedural rights to reopen 
deportation proceedings and to seek judicial review. Since 2008, the 
Court has taken numerous cases in which noncitizens sought to 
reopen a removal order to present a claimed right to remain. While 
these decisions do not directly consider proportionality qua 
proportionality — i.e., the ratio between the sanction of deportation 
and the nature of the offense — they raise equity concerns more 
generally, implicating access to statute-based forms of relief and the 
quality of immigrant representation in removal proceedings. 
Rounding out the survey, Part II.E discusses the Court’s recent 
decisions concerning immigration detention, including a pending 
blockbuster case that the Court will decide this term, Jennings v. 
Rodriguez.13 Because the Court’s jurisprudence in this area has been 
mixed, the state of the law regarding executive authority to detain 
 
 11 See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014); Jennifer M. 
Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
577 (2012) [hereinafter Immigration Federalism]; Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten 
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2013). 
 12 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
 13 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (granting petition for certiorari). 
  
2017] Judging Immigration Equity 1035 
during removal proceedings has been in flux since 2001. But 
noncitizens facing prolonged detention are already in a stronger 
position than in previous decades, and, if the Court upholds the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez,14 many more noncitizens will have the 
opportunity to secure release during immigration proceedings, thereby 
enabling opportunities to present stronger legal and equitable defenses 
to deportation. 
Part III turns to the implications, as well as the limitations, of the 
Court’s newfound proportionality-based scrutiny in this area. Part 
III.A draws attention to the significant fact that the Court has emerged 
as the sole federal branch concerned with the value of individual 
evaluation of the justifiability of deportation in cases involving 
noncitizens with criminal history. The Court also has recognized the 
possibility that removals can be disproportionate for undocumented 
noncitizens who have no apparent means of adjusting their status 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) — a point that 
suggests that executive branch officials could eventually prevail if 
large-scale non-enforcement initiatives return to the Court. Together, 
the Court’s deportation decisions create or reinforce structural rules 
supporting the possibility of equitable balancing for both criminal 
offenders and the undocumented, in multiple stages of the removal 
process. Recognizing the proportionality norm that drives all of this 
jurisprudence helps to explain and reconcile the modern Court’s 
deportation-related rulings in a wide variety of contexts.15 
Part III.B considers the implications of this analysis for deferred 
action programs such as those initiated by President Obama. While 
the DACA and DAPA programs reflected the administration’s 
proportionality concerns about particularly unjust applications of the 
immigration code, their size and largely categorical nature gave rise to 
controversy and legal uncertainty. Although ultimately side-stepping 
the issue of their constitutionality, this Part argues that the programs 
aligned with the equity-driven thrust of the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence, and in particular, Arizona. Significantly, the vast 
majority of noncitizens protected from state action by the Court’s 
 
 14 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016). 
 15 Cf. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 25) (on file 
with the author) (“Missing from the literature, however, is an organizing meta-theory 
for how to sort exceptional and mainstream doctrines within and across constitutional 
dimensions, and to explain why immigration should be exceptional for some purposes 
but not for others.”). 
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preemption findings in that case will have escaped federal enforcement 
as a consequence of macro-level enforcement and resource-allocation 
choices, rather than any case-by-case equitable balancing in individual 
cases. As such, Arizona helps lay some precedent for judicial validation 
of future administrative efforts to implement proportionality-driven 
non-enforcement efforts on a large scale. 
Finally, Part III.C turns to the limitations of the Court’s efforts thus 
far to ensure that the immigration system operates in a consistently 
just manner. Of particular importance, nearly all of these cases have 
been decided — unsurprisingly — on subconstitutional grounds.16 
Nor is the Court likely to endorse a constitutionally grounded 
substantive proportionality right in the removal context anytime 
soon.17 As a result, a future administration could enforce immigration 
laws with less regard for proportionality, and Congress could create an 
even harsher and more rigid system. The Court’s decisions in this area 
are perhaps best seen as signals — to lower courts, but especially to 
the political branches — that specific aspects of the deportation 
system are in dire need of reevaluation and reform. 
I. HARSH LAW AND EQUITABLE DELEGATION 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, Congress set into motion 
a radical transformation of immigration law in the United States. 
Extensive statutory changes to the immigration code made all 
unauthorized presence a deportable offense while vastly increasing the 
number of noncitizens — including lawful permanent residents 
(“LPRs”) — subject to deportation and barred from lawful return on 
the basis of criminal history.18 At the same time, criminal sentencing 
 
 16 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 579 
(1990) [hereinafter Phantom Constitutional Norms] (discussing the difference between 
rulings decided on phantom, or subconstitutional, issues versus rulings decided on 
constitutional issues). Although the primary mode of judicial reasoning in this area 
involves statutory interpretation, the Court in fact decided several path-breaking 
decisions on constitutional grounds in recent years. See infra Parts II.A and II.B 
(discussing Arizona and Padilla). 
 17 See Josh Bowers, Plea-Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083, 1090 
(2016) [hereinafter Baselines] (“For the Court, inquiries into proportionality and 
purpose are just too murky — too subjective and indeterminate . . . .”); Vicki C. 
Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3096 
(2015) (“The United States is often viewed as an outlier in this transnational embrace 
of proportionality in constitutional law.”). 
 18 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
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judges and administrative immigration judges, formerly empowered to 
balance the severity of deportation against the gravity of the 
underlying offense and the noncitizen’s particular claim for leniency, 
saw their equitable discretion eviscerated.19 As a result, petty 
shoplifting, turnstile-jumping, minor marijuana offenses, and many 
more minor crimes barely punishable under criminal laws now often 
result in automatic (or nearly automatic) removal, together with 
lengthy or permanent prohibition on lawful return.20 
Amendments to the INA put in place at this time also greatly 
expanded the use of immigration detention. Some of these provisions 
permit authorities to seek the detention of anyone facing removal.21 
Others mandate confinement, for example on the basis of criminal 
history, including convictions for marijuana possession, petty theft, or 
other minor offenses that in many cases have little or no relation to 
the underlying assessment of risk that detention is intended to guard 
against.22 The executive branch has vastly increased the number of 
noncitizens it detains in the twenty years since Congress enacted these 
detention rules. In 1996, about 6,600 persons were held in detention 
on any given day.23 Now, that number has increased to over 34,000 
immigration detainees per day, with over 400,000 detained each year 
in 250 separate prisons and secure facilities.24 
In short, the modern deportation system subjects many millions of 
long-term noncitizens to detention and removal, with little 
 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.); see Jason A. Cade, Enforcing 
Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 671-76 (2015) [hereinafter Enforcing 
Immigration Equity]; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 510-19 (2009) [hereinafter President and 
Immigration].  
 19 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 676-78. 
 20 Id. at 673-75; see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361 (2010) (describing how 
changes to the immigration code made deportation an almost automatic consequence 
of many criminal offenses). 
 21 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C § 1225(a), (b)(2)(A) 
(2012) (requiring detention of noncitizens seeking admission who are “not clearly and 
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted”); id. § 1231(a)(2), (a)(6) (requiring detention 
for up to 90 days following a removal order and authorizing continued detention 
beyond that period on a discretionary basis). 
 22 See id. § 1226(c) (providing that immigration officials “shall take into custody 
any alien who [is inadmissible or deportable on most criminal grounds] . . . when the 
alien is released”).  
 23 INS: Deportations, Detention, MIGRATION NEWS (June 1998) http://migration. 
ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1547. 
 24 See Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration 
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 365 (2014). 
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opportunity for formal consideration of whether these severe sanctions 
are justified in individual cases. And yet, the legislative constriction of 
immigration judges’ authority to set aside removal has not removed all 
consideration of fairness from the deportation system. As with 
squeezing a balloon, the contraction of judicial authority to wield 
equitable discretion has expanded the role of police and prosecutorial 
discretion in evaluating and extending relief to noncitizens based on 
their individual circumstances. This phenomenon is well understood 
in criminal law, where prosecutors’ commitment to the just 
application of the law has long been accepted as necessary to mitigate 
the effect of overly broad, overly punitive, and inflexible penal 
statutes.25 It seems that lawmakers increasingly rely on prosecutorial 
discretion to ensure that criminal law is appropriately applied to 
individual human beings.26 
Likewise, in the immigration context, Congress’s expansion of the 
grounds for removal coupled with its narrowing of adjudicative 
authority to grant discretionary relief effectively, if not intentionally, 
transferred substantial policy-making authority to enforcement 
officials.27 To be sure, Congress has expressly delegated vast swaths of 
authority to the executive branch to establish domestic immigration 
enforcement priorities and to manage the admission of foreign 
nationals fleeing persecution, upheaval, natural disasters, or other 
humanitarian situations.28 But the space for executive policy-making 
 
 25 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2010) [hereinafter Legal 
Guilt]; Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of 
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) [hereinafter The Arc of the Pendulum]; William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570-71 
(2001). 
 26 See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 154-57 (2007); Wayne LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United 
States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533 (1970); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1963 (1992) (arguing that legislators 
intend that prosecutors will “exercise their discretion not to pursue habitual criminal 
sentencing for offenders who [fall] within the statute but seemed not to deserve such 
harsh treatment”). 
 27 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 679-81; Cox & 
Rodríguez, President and Immigration, supra note 18, at 464; Stephen Lee, De Facto 
Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 553-54 (2013); Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and 
the Civil-Criminal Divide, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1820-21 (2011) [hereinafter The 
Discretion that Matters]. 
 28 See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security with 
“[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a) (2012) (conferring broad power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over 
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power in this area also stems from “a profound mismatch between the 
law on the books and the reality on the ground,” an incongruity 
resulting from “a series of legal, political, and demographic 
developments that have accelerated over the last four decades.”29 
These developments include not only the INA’s blunderbuss removal 
provisions, but also the longstanding acquiescence by both political 
branches in the unauthorized migration and employment of 
noncitizens.30 
I have argued in previous work that Congress’s explicit and de facto 
delegations of authority to the executive branch obligate immigration 
officials to ensure that immigration laws are not enforced in an 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or disproportionate manner.31 In Enforcing 
 
“the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the 
immigration and naturalization of aliens”); id. § 1254a(b)(1) (delegating the Attorney 
General authority to designate countries in which natural disasters, war, or other 
significant upheaval warrant granting “temporary protected status” to nationals of 
those countries residing in the United States); id. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (delegating 
authority to the Attorney General to “parole” inadmissible noncitizens into the 
country for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”); Refugee Act 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 102-03 (1980) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (giving the President authority to determine the 
countries from which refugees would be admitted and the total number of refugee 
admissions each year).  
 29 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law 
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 131 (2015) [hereinafter Redux]; see also MOTOMURA, supra 
note 11, at 19-55 (explaining the political and historical factors that contributed to the 
size of the current unauthorized population and the connection with enforcement 
discretion).  
 30 See MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 19-55; Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 
29, at 147-49.  
 31 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 661 (offering a critical 
assessment of the Obama administration’s efforts to administer deportation equitably); 
Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180, 187-98 
(2013) [hereinafter Policing the Immigration Police] (arguing that the Executive bears 
responsibility for ensuring that the Fourth Amendment is fully upheld in the 
administration of immigration law whether or not judicially enforceable remedies for 
constitutional violations are available); Jason A. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 25, 39 (2015), http://www.nyulawreview.org/online-features/return-jrad 
[hereinafter Return of the JRAD] (arguing that immigration officials should rely on 
pardons, expungements, and sentencing judges’ recommendations against deportation 
as “disproportionality rules of thumb” when determining whether to pursue removal 
against noncitizens with criminal history); Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing 
Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2014) [hereinafter The 
Challenge of Seeing Justice Done] (suggesting a range of administrative reforms to make 
deportation hearings more accurate and fair); Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis 
for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1812-13 (2013) 
[hereinafter Plea Bargain Crisis] (arguing that the Executive should scale back 
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Immigration Equity, for example, I described the primary ways in 
which the Department of Homeland Security implemented its 
discretionary enforcement powers in immigration law under the 
Obama administration.32 These measures include (1) focusing finite 
resources on the apprehension and removal of recent border-crossers 
and noncitizens who encounter criminal justice systems, (2) pushing 
for increased use of prosecutorial discretion in individual deportation 
cases, and (3) creating programs to administer discretion on a more 
consistent basis for certain noncitizens.33 
While these actions reflect serious (if not extraordinary) efforts to 
administer deportation rules fairly, significant challenges hamper a 
system that relies so heavily on enforcement discretion to remain 
normatively justifiable.34 Central among these obstacles are (1) an 
entrenched enforcement culture that treats almost any criminal history 
as an irrefutable proxy for undesirability, (2) crushing workloads for 
front-line operatives, who otherwise might be open to investigating 
the mitigating details of individual deportation cases, and (3) political 
pushback against the exercise of prosecutorial leniency.35 Enforcing 
Immigration Equity proposed a range of legislative and administrative 
reforms that might improve the existing system. Most importantly, 
Congress could roll back the breadth of removal provisions and 
restore a larger measure of equitable discretion to sentencing judges 
and immigration judges.36 Additionally, it could enact limitations 
periods prohibiting the use of very old convictions as the basis for 
deportation.37 Congress could also strengthen certain procedural 
protections that improve the accuracy and fairness of removal-
proceeding outcomes.38 And the Executive could undertake many 
similar, if distinctly second-best, administrative reforms.39 
Whether through legislative or administrative measures, Enforcing 
Immigration Equity argued, “severe penalties imposed on the basis of 
 
immigration enforcement measures targeting noncitizens facing only misdemeanor 
charges in light of (1) such convictions’ general unreliability as evidence of wrong-
doing and (2) corrosive feedback loops created by the federal immigration agency’s 
integration with the misdemeanor system).  
 32 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 687-98.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 698-713.  
 35 Id. at 698-711; Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 31, at 46-75.  
 36 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 714-17.  
 37 Id. at 715-16.  
 38 Id. at 717-18.  
 39 Id. at 719-23; Cade, Return of the JRAD, supra note 31, at 45-50; Cade, The 
Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 31, at 61-65.  
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criminal convictions must be predicated on considerations of 
individualized justice.”40 Government decision makers — including 
administrative agencies charged with meting out severe sanctions on a 
large scale — should be, in Michael Lipsky’s words, “responsive to the 
unique circumstances of individual transgressions.”41 My prior work 
suggested that if the political branches do not take action to ensure the 
deportation system’s commitment to proportionality and fairness, 
pressure to intervene would come to bear on federal courts.42 As I 
develop in Part II of this article, it appears that concerns about 
disproportionate results have already motivated the Supreme Court to 
make equity-driven adjustments to the removal system over the past 
fifteen years, in a break from a long-standing policy of extreme 
deference to the political branches.43 
II. STRUCTURING DEPORTATION DISCRETION IN THE MODERN SYSTEM 
In this Part, I explain how key Supreme Court cases work to 
promote and structure the exercise of discretion in the modern 
deportation system. Across a diverse body of law, the modern Court 
has endeavored to preserve, restore, or create opportunities for the 
individual balancing of equities in deportation proceedings, including 
for noncitizens who have a criminal history or who lack lawful 
immigration status. For present purposes, the Court’s decisions fall 
into five categories: (1) preserving federal discretionary enforcement 
authority, (2) promoting equitable considerations in cases involving 
noncitizens with criminal history, (3) curbing arbitrary and capricious 
charging discretion, (4) safeguarding procedural rights to reopen 
removal proceedings and to seek judicial review, and (5) regulating 
immigration detention. In the main, this Part considers each set of 
cases independently, although it also notes important overlaps and 
 
 40 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 724.  
 41 MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICES 15 (2010) (“[S]ociety seeks not only impartiality from its public 
agencies but also compassion for special circumstances and flexibility in dealing with 
them.”). 
 42 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 723-24.  
 43 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (“[A]ny policy 
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in 
regard to the conduct of foreign relates, the war power, and the maintenance of a 
republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the 
political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724-30 (1893).  
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interlocking connections. Part III will turn to the broader themes and 
implications of the Court’s approach across the decisions. 
A. Federal (Non-)Enforcement Discretion 
In recent years, a number of states have passed laws attempting to 
give state and local officials a larger role in enforcing restrictions on 
the employment of noncitizens and other aspects of immigration 
law.44 Some states have been transparent that the goal of such policies 
is to deter the entry or continued presence of undocumented 
noncitizens.45 The Obama administration brought lawsuits against 
several of these states, including Arizona, endeavoring to invalidate 
their subfederal immigration controls on preemption grounds.46 On 
June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. United States, 
which clarified the federal government’s primacy in this area, although 
preserving some room for state activity.47 The Court struck down most 
of the challenged provisions of Arizona’s omnibus law, which 
essentially had created a state-level branch of the federal immigration 
enforcement system. Most remarkable about Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion for the present inquiry is the degree to which it 
recognizes that equity in the deportation scheme today depends 
almost entirely on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.48 As a 
result, the Court’s rulings in the case can be understood to structurally 
insulate the executive’s ability to exercise its discretion so as to 
administer deportation law in a normatively just manner.49 
At the outset, Justice Kennedy observed that a “principle feature of 
the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration 
officials.”50 He then explicitly connected federal agencies’ exercise of 
 
 44 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-6 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 
(2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(b) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-100 to -109 
(2013). 
 45 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (noting that 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 establishes “an official state policy of ‘attrition through 
enforcement,’” intended to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of 
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States” 
(citations omitted)). 
 46 See Jeremy Pelofsky & James Vicini, Obama Administration Sues Arizona over 
Immigration Law, REUTERS (July 6, 2010, 11:54 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-obama-immigration-lawsuit-idUSTRE6653Q320100707. 
 47 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492. 
 48 See id. at 2499. 
 49 See also Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 683-85 (analyzing 
the federal government’s equity-based arguments in the Arizona litigation). 
 50 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added). 
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prosecutorial discretion to the implementation of equity in the 
deportation system: 
Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it 
makes sense to pursue removal at all. . . . Discretion in the 
enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human 
concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their 
families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien 
smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities 
of an individual case may turn on many factors, including 
whether the alien has children born in the United States, long 
ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military 
service. . . . Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed 
inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense 
or fails to meet the criteria for admission.51 
This language is striking in its candor about the realities of the 
modern immigration system. Prosecutorial discretion now plays a key 
role in shaping deportation policy, due to the overwhelming size of 
the potentially deportable population, the extraordinary breadth of the 
INA’s removal provisions, and the dearth of opportunities for 
discretionary relief from removal at the adjudicative stage of 
proceedings.52 Justice Kennedy’s language acknowledges that not all 
noncitizens made deportable by Congress are similarly situated and 
that executive enforcement officials should weigh individual equities 
in determining the appropriateness of removal in particular cases. This 
stark endorsement of the central role of enforcement discretion in the 
modern deportation scheme — including discretion not to pursue 
persons who are formally removable — set the stage for the Court’s 
preemption analysis of the challenged provisions of S.B. 1070. 
Throughout its discussion of the challenged statutory provisions, 
the Court explained its preemption rulings in light of the value of the 
executive’s implementation of equity through control over 
enforcement decisions. For example, in striking down section 3 of the 
state law (which criminalized noncitizens’ failure to complete or carry 
an alien registration document), the Court emphasized the risk posed 
to the “integrated scheme” of regulation created by Congress, a 
scheme that envisions broad federal control over enforcement 
 
 51 Id. at 2499 (emphasis added). 
 52 See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 9-13 (2015); supra Part I and 
accompanying text. 
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decisions.53 As stated by the Court: “Were § 3 to come into force, the 
State would have the power to bring criminal charges against 
individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances where 
federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that 
prosecution would frustrate federal policies.”54 In other words, the 
Court was concerned that section 3 would enable state or local 
authorities to negate the federal government’s determination not to 
penalize certain removable individuals, whether resulting from case-
by-case evaluation or macro-enforcement priorities. 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis of section 6 of S.B. 1070, which would 
have given state officers authority to make warrantless arrests of any 
noncitizen whom the officer has probable cause to believe had 
committed a removable offense, centered on the same theme. As he 
explained: 
By authorizing state officers to decide whether an alien should 
be detained for being removable, § 6 violates the principle that 
the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the 
Federal Government. A decision on removability requires a 
determination whether it is appropriate to allow a foreign 
national to continue living in the United States.55 
Here, too, the Court unabashedly recognized that the executive’s role 
in setting deportation policy encompasses decisions not to enforce 
laws against deportable noncitizens. The Court found worrisome the 
possibility that state officers could subject noncitizens “whom federal 
officials determine should not be removed” to “unnecessary 
harassment.”56 To be sure, Congress has created opportunities for 
non-federal cooperative immigration enforcement. Nevertheless, 
emphasized Justice Kennedy, the scheme requires overarching 
supervision by federal immigration officials in light of the “significant 
complexities involved in enforcing federal immigration law.”57 Section 
6, in contrast, would have given the state independent authority to 
implement the immigration system’s most coercive and powerful tool 
 
 53 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
 54 Id. at 2503. 
 55 Id. at 2506 (citations omitted). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.; see also id. at 2507 (“There may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes 
cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the term would 
incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being 
removable absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal 
Government.”).  
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— detention — without regard to federal decisions not to target or 
prosecute the detained individual. As the Court explained at the outset 
of the opinion, the federal decisionmaking threatened by S.B. 1070, 
and sections 3 and 6 in particular,58 “embraces immediate human 
concerns” that may justify non-enforcement against even statutorily 
removable noncitizens.59 
In contrast, the one provision of S.B. 1070 that survived preemption 
was perceived by the Court to aid, rather than threaten, the executive’s 
ability to equitably implement deportation law. Section 2(B) mandates 
that state officers make a reasonable attempt to determine the 
immigration status of all persons who have been stopped, detained, or 
arrested on some other legitimate basis, if the officer has reasonable 
suspicion that the person is unlawfully present. Consultation and 
information sharing about potential immigration-violators, the Court 
observed, furthers Congress’s design of the modern deportation 
system and does not interfere with federal control over the 
implementation of immigration priorities.60 Unlike section 6, which 
would have allowed Arizona authorities to unilaterally determine 
immigration violations and detain on that basis alone, section 2(B) 
does not supply any independent grounds for police to make or to 
lengthen stops. 
Scholars have questioned whether Section 2(B) might still give local 
authorities outsized influence over federal immigration caseloads, 
including through discriminatory policing tactics.61 Because these 
scholars have suggested that equal-protection-based concerns 
influenced, at least in part, the preemption rulings in Arizona, the 
Court’s decision not to strike down section 2(B) is seen as a 
 
 58 The Court’s invalidation of section 5(C), criminalizing noncitizens who engage 
in unauthorized employment, also reflected concern that the state law would threaten 
the Executive’s ability to balance priorities in enforcement, although the Court tied 
that aspect of its holding more directly to Congress’s considered decision not to 
impose criminal penalties for unauthorized employment. See id. at 2505. 
 59 Id. at 2499. 
 60 Id. at 2508-09; see also id. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“At bottom, the discretion that ultimately matters is not whether to verify a 
person’s immigration status but whether to act once the person’s status is known. . . . 
[T]he Federal Government retains the . . . discretion to enforce the law in particular 
cases.”). 
 61 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 130-42; Chacón, Immigration Federalism, 
supra note 11, at 580 (“[I]n upholding Section 2(B), the Court left in place a provision 
that was a source of deep concern for opponents of the law, and effectively green-
lighted systematic state and local participation in immigration enforcement in a way 
that failed to account for the inevitable discriminatory effects of such participation.”). 
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contradiction or mistake.62 Perhaps so, but if the Court’s primary 
concern regarding modern immigration enforcement is 
proportionality, rather than discrimination,63 then a state law aimed at 
securing and sharing information about the whereabouts and activities 
of noncitizens merely facilitates the federal executive’s ability to 
establish and act on enforcement priorities.64 To be clear, I see no 
reason to dispute the claim that state or federal laws such as section 
2(B) increase the risk of discriminatory policing at the local level.65 
Rather, the relevant point for present purposes is that the Court 
closely tied its preemption analysis of each of the challenged 
provisions in Arizona to its perception that the federal government 
must retain broad discretion to decide “whether . . . to pursue removal 
at all,”66 and recognizing the significance of this newfound 
acknowledgement of the role of enforcement-driven proportionality in 
the deportation system helps explain its preemption rulings. 
The outcome of Arizona took many by surprise.67 Recent federal 
case law in the immigration field had given state lawmakers reason to 
believe their controls would survive on a “mirror image” theory. In 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, decided only a year before Arizona, 
the Court upheld a different provision of Arizona’s law, which 
required employers to use a federal database to check whether 
 
 62 See MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 130-42; Chacón, Immigration Federalism, supra 
note 11, at 609-17; Guttentag, supra note 11, at 41 (“If immigrant equality were 
acknowledged as a core value of federal law, evidence that Section 2B increases the 
danger of profiling or discrimination would properly be part of the preemption 
analysis rather than be marginalized as an entirely distinct claim.”). 
 63 At the outset of the Solicitor General’s oral argument in Arizona, Chief Justice 
Roberts interjected: “Before you get into what the case is about, I’d like to clear up at 
the outset what it’s not about. No part of your argument has to do with racial or ethnic 
profiling, does it? I saw none of that in your brief. . . . So this is not a case about 
ethnic profiling.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
 64 Cf. Adam Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 
SUP. CT. REV. 31, 61-62 (2012).  
 65 Indeed, some of my previous work focuses on that very issue. See Cade, Policing 
the Immigration Police, supra note 31. 
 66 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2499; see also id. at 2521 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“But to say, as the Court does, that Arizona contradicts federal law by 
enforcing applications of the Immigration Act that the President declines to enforce 
boggles the mind.” (emphasis in original)). 
 67 See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court 2009–13: A New Era of 
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 87, 91 (2015) [hereinafter 
Immigration in the Supreme Court] (noting that the result in Arizona v. United States 
“surprised many observers who predicted that the conservative Roberts Court would 
uphold the law in its entirety”). 
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potential noncitizen employees are federally authorized to work, even 
though federal law does not make use of the verification system 
mandatory.68 In Arizona, however, the Court declined to employ the 
states-can-mirror-federal-law reasoning, focusing instead on the need 
to protect federal choices regarding prosecutorial discretion from 
disruption.69 
The Court’s expansive conception of preemption in Arizona has 
both detractors and supporters within the legal academy.70 In Kevin 
Johnson’s view, the Court’s approach was in line with other recent 
preemption rulings.71 Other commentators have noted, however, that 
Arizona does not conform to traditional preemption analysis.72 Adam 
Cox, for example, observed that it is common for states to help 
 
 68 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). Arguably, however, 
what really mattered in Whiting was the carve-out in the applicable federal law. IRCA, 
while expressly preempting state employer sanctions, does allow states to use 
“licensing and similar laws,” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012), which is what Arizona 
had done with the state statute at issue. Cf. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 
supra note 67, at 80-81 (“Whiting is a narrowly drawn decision dealing with the 
interpretation and application of the language of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act. The Court carefully adhered to the plain meaning of the statute, which expressly 
preserves state authority to exercise the licensing power to facilitate enforcement of 
the employer sanctions provisions of the federal immigration law.”). 
 69 David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 81, 87 (2013) [hereinafter Immigration Structuralism] (noting that the “proffered 
conflict was between executive policies that focus enforcement resources on targeted 
subclasses of unlawfully present immigrants and Arizona’s arrest-and-report laws that 
target a generic and undifferentiated class of undocumented immigrants”). 
 70 Compare David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 983, 993-1004 (2016) (arguing that only the Constitution, statutes, and treaties 
— not executive enforcement policies — can provide a constitutional basis to preempt 
state laws), with MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 130-42 (arguing that preemption 
analysis in immigration law necessarily involves a decision about the relative risk of 
unconstitutional activity by enforcers, and defending the Arizona v. United States 
decision on the ground that nonfederal actors are more like to violate constitutional 
rights of noncitizens when enforcing federal immigration law), and Catherine Y. Kim, 
Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 691 (2014) (undertaking a functionalist defense of the preemption decisions in 
Arizona v. United States, in light of the unique context of modern immigration law). 
 71 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 86-91 
(describing the preemption rulings in Arizona v. United States as “unremarkable” and 
citing, inter alia, Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387-88 (2000) 
and Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)); see also Harlan G. Cohen, 
Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
380, 406-08, 415-16, 438-39 (2015) (discussing connections between Crosby, 
Garamendi, and Arizona v. United States). 
 72 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 64; David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1125 (2012). 
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enforce federal laws.73 States regularly make arrests for violations of 
federal criminal law, or attach state penalties to conduct proscribed by 
federal law. The courts have typically viewed such “enforcement 
redundancy” as acceptable and consonant with federal goals.74 The 
result is that, in many areas of law enforcement, state efforts to 
reinforce federal controls are constitutional.75 
Whatever else might be said about this debate, the key point for 
present purposes is that the Court in Arizona squarely recognized that 
the enforcement stage is now the primary point at which equitable 
discretion comes into play for the great majority of deportable 
noncitizens.76 The Court’s decision preserved the primacy of federal 
supervision of enforcement discretion, tying its reasoning to the 
realities of a system characterized by staggeringly broad grounds of 
deportability and abandonment of formal adjudicative discretion. 
Importantly, the federal enforcement discretion preserved by the 
Court in Arizona is not contingent upon immigration status. Instead, 
the decision contemplates and endorses enforcement authorities’ 
consideration of the appropriateness of initiating proceedings against 
any deportable noncitizen, including persons unlawfully present.77 
As I develop further in Part III, however, it is crucial to recognize 
that the Court’s ruling in Arizona falls far short of ensuring 
proportionality, nondiscrimination, or rationality in the removal 
system.78 Clearly, federal enforcement officials might fail to balance 
equities or to enforce the law in a nondiscriminatory manner when 
making removal decisions. Thus, Arizona merely preserves the 
potential for targeted and sensible equity-based enforcement decisions 
made at the federal level.79 That said, to the extent the Court wishes 
 
 73 See Cox, supra note 64, at 34-41; see also Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of 
the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 
253, 255 (2011). 
 74 See Cox, supra note 64, at 34-41.  
 75 See id. at 41-48.  
 76 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-45, Torres v. Lynch, No. 14-1096 (U.S. 
Nov. 3, 2015), 2015 WL 9919328 (Chief Justice John Roberts suggesting that if the 
aggravated felony category sweeps too broadly, “the attorney general may decide not 
to subject the alien to removal in the first place, right?”). 
 77 See infra Part III.A (discussing the applicability of the Court’s deportation 
rulings to undocumented noncitizens).  
 78 See infra Part III.C.  
 79 See MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 130-42 (defending the Arizona v. United States 
decision for its implied recognition that nonfederal actors are more like to violate 
constitutional rights of noncitizens when enforcing federal immigration law); Carrie 
L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis of Sub-Federal 
Immigration Laws: The California Trust Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 481, 523 (2015) 
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for the legislature (or the judiciary, within institutional constraints) to 
be able to further shape or regulate executive policy in immigration 
law, that task is somewhat easier when the appropriate enforcement 
body is centralized and federal, rather than a multitude of state and 
local regulators. 
B. Equitable Considerations in Cases Involving Criminal History 
The centrality of criminal history in triggering deportation delegates 
de facto power to screen for undesirable noncitizens to law 
enforcement actors in the criminal justice system.80 Indeed, the 
outcome of criminal proceedings determines not only whether a 
noncitizen is removable, but also whether the person may be subject 
to detention, foreclosed from seeking discretionary relief, or barred 
from ever returning lawfully to the United States.81 The now almost-
automatic linkage between these harsh consequences and a criminal 
court conviction dramatically raises the stakes of choices made by 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and noncitizen defendants. While the 
Obama administration appeared to recognize an obligation to enforce 
deportation laws equitably,82 its enforcement agency deported more 
noncitizens in eight years than at any other time in United States 
history.83 The administration also largely declined to differentiate 
among so-called “criminal aliens,” treating almost any kind of criminal 
history as an “irrefutable signifier of undesirability in the modern 
deportation system.”84 Recent rulings suggest that this aggressive 
 
(“Federal exclusivity has the potential to prevent the erosion of anti-discrimination 
principles resulting from increasing involvement of sub-federal agents in immigration 
enforcement.”).  
 80 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 682-83; see also Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. at 365-66 (noting that many immigration consequences now 
follow automatically from criminal convictions); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting 
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1350 (2010) (“With mandatory deportation 
rules, the criminal prosecutor becomes the immigration screener.”); Ingrid V. Eagly, 
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV 1126, 1156-96 (2013) [hereinafter Criminal Justice for Noncitizens]; Lee, 
supra note 27, at 572-77; Motomura, The Discretion that Matters, supra note 27, at 
1852-53. 
 81 See supra Part I. 
 82 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 687-98 (explaining the 
Obama administration’s targeted distribution of resources, prosecutorial discretion 
initiatives, and categorical reprieves such as DACA and DAPA).  
 83 Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of 
Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58, 74 (2015) 
[hereinafter Deferred Action]. 
 84 Cade, Return of the JRAD, supra note 31, at 42-44; see also Cade, Enforcing 
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approach to enforcement of the INA’s broad criminal law provisions 
troubles a majority of the Supreme Court. As the following sections 
explain, the Court has issued a series of decisions that reflect deep 
concerns about inequitable deportations based on criminal history.85 
1. Making Deals 
The Court’s discomfort with the punitive and inflexible turn that 
immigration law took in the 1990s first surfaced in its 2001 decision 
INS v. St. Cyr.86 Enrico St. Cyr was a Haitian citizen who became a 
lawful permanent resident of the U.S. in 1986. St. Cyr pled guilty to 
sale of a controlled substance, a few months before Congress installed 
the modern immigration law structure by enacting the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA).87 The Court first had to decide an important procedural 
question, which was whether Congress’s amendments to the INA in 
1996 eliminated habeas corpus review. Employing the constitutional 
avoidance canon to find such review still intact,88 the substantive 
question before the Court was whether St. Cyr could seek the exercise 
of remedial equitable discretion by an immigration judge pursuant to a 
repealed provision of the INA, known as 212(c), because his 
conviction had occurred before the repeal.89 In an opinion by Justice 
Stevens, the Court observed that Congress’s broadening of the 
deportation provisions in the early 1990s meant that an “extremely 
large” number of noncitizens had relied on equitable adjudicative 
relief in order to remain in the United States prior to the repeal of 
212(c). Indeed, the Court observed that, “not surprisingly,” over half 
of noncitizens’ applications for 212(c) relief had been granted by 
immigration judges.90 
 
Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 700-09; Jayesh Rathod, Crimmigration Creep: 
Reframing Executive Action on Immigration, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 173, 173-74 (2015) 
(arguing that DACA and DAPA criteria entrench a “significant misdemeanor” bar to 
eligibility). 
 85 See infra Part III.A.  
 86 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 87 Id. at 289.  
 88 The Court found the absence of an alternative forum, coupled with the lack of 
an unambiguous and express statement of congressional intent to preclude all habeas 
review, counseled against a statutory construction that would raise serious 
constitutional questions. Id. at 298-314.  
 89 Id. at 292-93. 
 90 Id. at 296. 
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Addressing the government’s argument that the elimination of 
212(c) applied retroactively to bar St. Cyr from seeking equitable 
relief, the Court expressed unease with the contention that the 
“[l]egislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled 
expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration.”91 As 
a result, the Court articulated and applied a presumption against 
retroactive elimination of discretionary relief in favor of St. Cyr.92 The 
Court held that Congress would need to provide an unambiguous, 
clear statement if it intended that persons deportable on the basis of 
convictions obtained before IIRIRA should be ineligible for the 
balancing of equities that, before 1996, had long marked U.S. 
deportation law. 
The Court’s rulings in St. Cyr were controversial. The principle of 
constitutional avoidance, for example, provided less than airtight 
support for the Court’s decision on 212(c), because it had held many 
times that the ex post facto clause does not apply in the civil 
immigration context, leaving Congress free to make retroactive-
looking changes to deportation law.93 Even so, background concerns 
about discretionary justice carried the day for St. Cyr, as the majority 
emphasized the unfairness of retroactively disadvantaging defendants 
who might have pleaded guilty to certain crimes in reliance on the 
possibility that section 212(c) could safeguard them from 
deportation.94 Put simply, Justice Stevens’s opinion signaled the 
Court’s emerging worries about the wooden and inhumane operation 
of the modern-day immigration system. And these same concerns have 
resurfaced in numerous immigration decisions issued in the wake of 
St. Cyr. 
Vartelas v. Holder, for example, involved another provision of 
IIRIRA that changed the rules for Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) 
with past convictions.95 Historically, LPRs could travel abroad without 
needing to apply for re-admission to the United States, so long as the 
 
 91 Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994)). 
 92 Id. at 315-16. 
 93 See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 38 (1990); Lehmann v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 685, 690 (1957); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955); 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952). 
 94 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315, 320-25; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 
(2010) (“[W]e have recognized that ‘preserving the possibility of’ discretionary relief 
from deportation under § 212(c) of the 1952 INA, repealed by Congress in 1996, 
‘would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether 
to accept a plea offer or instead proceed to trial.’”). 
 95 Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012). 
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excursion was “innocent, casual, and brief.”96 As amended in 1996, 
however, the statute deems LPRs who travel abroad as presumptively 
inadmissible if they fall into any of six categories.97 One of these 
categories tracks the statutory grounds for criminal-based 
inadmissibility, barring from readmission any permanent resident who 
has committed, for example, a controlled substance offense, a crime 
involving moral turpitude, or more than one conviction of any type.98 
This amendment worked a significant change in the legal framework, 
because the grounds of deportability are generally narrower than the 
grounds of inadmissibility and because noncitizens seeking admission 
have the burden to demonstrate admissibility, whereas the 
government bears the burden when it seeks to deport an LPR.99 
Panagis Vartelas had been a permanent resident for over 20 years 
when he was put into removal proceedings upon return from a one-
week trip to Greece.100 Because Vartelas had a 1994 conviction for 
conspiracy to counterfeit (a crime involving moral turpitude), an 
immigration officer classified him as seeking admission.101 He was put 
into removal proceedings, found inadmissible, and ordered 
removed.102 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a six-Justice majority highlighted 
some of Vartelas’s equities, including long residence and gainful 
employment in the United States.103 With respect to the context of the 
underlying conviction, the Court observed that although Vartelas 
“helped his [business] partner perforate the sheets into individual 
checks,” he personally “did not sell the checks or receive any money 
 
 96 Id. at 1484 (quoting Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1963)). 
 97 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012). 
 98 Id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (providing that LPRs must seek re-admission if they 
have “committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title”); see, e.g., id. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crimes involving moral turpitude); id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) 
(controlled substance offenses); id. § 1182(a)(2)(B) (multiple criminal convictions of 
any type); id. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (prostitution or commercialized vice); id. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(I) (money laundering). 
 99 For example, LPRs are only deportable for a conviction involving moral 
turpitude if committed within five years of entry to the United States. Id. § 1227(a)(2). 
Additionally, one must have an actual conviction to trigger the deportation ground, 
while the grounds of admissibility can be triggered even without a conviction.  
 100 See Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1485. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1485-86. 
 103 Id. at 1485; see also id. at 1487-88 (“It is no answer to say, as the Government 
suggests, that Vartelas could have avoided any adverse consequences if he simply 
stayed at home in the United States, his residence for 24 years prior to his 2003 visit to 
his parents in Greece.”). 
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from the venture.”104 And the reason Vartelas traveled abroad, wrote 
Justice Ginsburg, was “to visit his aging parents.”105 
The Court also noted that Vartelas’s first two attorneys in his 
deportation proceedings had been highly ineffective.106 One failed to 
appear for two hearings and did not file a requested brief, while the 
other undertook a doomed strategy of conceding removability and 
seeking a waiver of the inadmissibility grounds. After Vartelas’s 
deportation order became final, a third attorney filed a timely motion 
to reopen, alleging that the statutory provision at issue did not apply 
retroactively to deprive Vartelas of lawful status on the basis of a pre-
IIRIRA conviction.107 
Regarding the merits, the Court was “[g]uided by the deeply rooted 
presumption against retroactive legislation.”108 This presumption, the 
Court noted, “embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our 
Republic.”109 The Court agreed with Vartelas’s contention that 
applying IIRIRA retroactively attaches a “new disability” to his past 
conviction. In particular, application of the new provision to persons 
like Vartelas would burden their ability to travel abroad “to fulfill 
religious obligations, attend funerals and weddings of family members, 
tend to vital financial interests, or respond to family emergencies.”110 
The Court found the loss of the ability to journey outside of the 
country to be a draconian sanction.111 
The majority was particularly troubled that the law reached past 
criminal history long “over and done” before the new provision came 
into effect.112 Indeed, the Court suggested the retroactivity issue in 
Vartelas was even more problematic than the provision considered in 
St. Cyr. St. Cyr’s guilty plea had left him with only the possibility of 
 
 104 Id. at 1485.  
 105 Id. 
 106 See id. at 1485-86. 
 107 Id. at 1486. The BIA denied the motion to reopen on the grounds that prior 
counsel’s ineffective assistance had not prejudiced Vartelas because no law prevented 
retroactive application of IIRIRA’s admission provision. The Second Circuit affirmed. 
 108 Id. at 1484.  
 109 Id. at 1486 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)).  
 110 Id. at 1487.  
 111 See id. at 1488.  
 112 Id. at 1487; see also id. at 1489 (“Vartelas, we have several times stressed, 
engaged in no criminal activity after IIRIRA’s passage. . . . Vartelas was apprehended 
because of a pre-IIRIRA crime he was ‘helpless to undo.’”); id. at 1490 (“That new 
disability rested not on any continuing criminal activity, but on a single crime 
committed years before IIRIRA’s enactment.”). 
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seeking discretionary relief from removal. Vartelas’s plea, in contrast, 
did not expose him to deportation and left him free to make brief, 
unencumbered trips abroad until IIRIRA went into effect.113 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices 
Thomas and Alito, confirmed the equity-driven nature of the 
majority’s ruling. Indeed, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for 
contorting the statutory text in order to reach a “fair” result in the 
case.114 The dissenters reasoned that the relevant activity was not 
Vartelas’s plea, but rather his later departure and reentry to the United 
States, which in this case occurred years after the effective date of 
IIRIRA.115 
Vartelas, like St. Cyr, exhibited the Court’s concern with the 
retroactive attachment of harsh immigration consequences to past 
criminal history. Although the Court did not invalidate the statute at 
issue in Vartelas, it again applied an anti-retroactivity norm to the 
operation of the provision in a way that exempted from its reach LPRs 
with old convictions.116 As discussed further below, the case also 
illustrates the importance of post-order motions to reopen as vehicles 
for injecting some equity into the removal system,117 as well as the 
Court’s related concerns about avoidable deportations due to shoddy 
lawyering, which lurks as an important background factor in a 
number of the Court’s decisions.118 
 
 113 Although the Court made clear that a noncitizen need not demonstrate actual 
reliance on the pre-IIRIRA legal regime to benefit from the anti-retroactivity principle, 
Justice Ginsburg speculated that “Vartelas likely relied on then-existing immigration 
law” when he pleaded guilty in 1994. Id. at 1491-92. The Court also observed that 
Congress did not expressly indicate that the statutory provision would have 
retroactive effect, while other provisions of IIRIRA did indicate retroactive application. 
Id. at 1487. 
 114 Id. at 1495-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 115 See id. at 1492-93, 1496. Seen from that viewpoint, the 1996 amendment simply 
was not retroactive. See id. at 1493-94. 
 116 Vartelas did not challenge the agency’s determination that Congress abrogated 
the Court’s Fleuti doctrine, which had protected LPRs who briefly sojourn abroad 
from application of the INA’s inadmissibility provisions. See generally THOMAS 
ALEXANDER ALEINEKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS & POLICY (7th 
ed. 2012) (discussing the admission procedures). The Vartelas Court noted in a 
footnote that it was assuming, but not deciding, that the agency’s determination that 
Fleuti was prospectively abrogated was correct. Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1484, n.2.  
 117 See infra Part II.D. 
 118 See infra text accompanying notes 119–39, 262–71 (discussing Padilla and 
Mata). On the quality of representation in immigration proceedings generally, see 
Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration 
Litigation, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 475 (2015). 
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The Court’s discomfort with the inflexible operation and harsh 
consequences of current deportation rules was even more apparent in 
its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,119 which took the rare step of 
regulating an aspect of the removal system through a constitutional 
criminal procedure ruling.120 The Court’s watershed holding in that 
case — that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense counsel 
to render effective advice about the potential immigration 
consequences of a conviction — marked a significant departure from 
the views of lower federal courts.121 For a majority of the Court, this 
result was firmly rooted in the new realities of federal immigration 
law, including the evisceration of opportunities for leniency in the face 
of criminal convictions. 
As in many other recent deportation cases, Justice Stevens’s opinion 
for a majority of the Court emphasized the petitioner’s equities, 
describing Jose Padilla as a “lawful permanent resident of the United 
States for more than 40 years” who “served this Nation with honor as 
a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War.”122 
Padilla got into trouble when a large quantity of marijuana was 
discovered in his tractor-trailer. Thereafter, relying on erroneous 
advice from his counsel, he pleaded guilty to drug charges that in fact 
made deportation virtually automatic. 
Observing that “[t]he landscape of federal immigration law has 
changed dramatically over the last 90 years,”123 the Court catalogued 
congressional initiatives that have come to bear on noncitizens such as 
Padilla. It noted that for much of the twentieth century the grounds of 
 
 119 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 120 The rarity of a constitutional holding in this area is underscored by the fact that 
even the Court’s substantive criminal law decisions are usually decided through 
subconstitutional means. See Kate Stith-Cabranes, Criminal Law and the Supreme 
Court: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Byron White, 74 COLO. L. REV. 1523, 1548 
(2003); see generally Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 16 
(explaining that the Court’s decisions concerning noncitizens’ rights typically employ 
subconstitutional analysis, albeit informed by “phantom” constitutional norms).  
 121 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 383 (Alito, J. and Roberts, C.J., concurring) (calling the 
majority’s decision “a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law” and noting that “the 
Court’s view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the 
issue thus far”); see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106 (2013) 
(determining that Padilla constituted a new rule and should not have retroactive effect). 
Justice Stevens, who had authored the majority opinion in Padilla, expressed 
disappointment about the Court’s ruling in Chaidez in a post-retirement interview. See 
Linda Greenhouse, Speaking Truth to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (April 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion/speaking-truth-to-the-supreme-court.html.  
 122 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. 
 123 Id. at 360. 
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criminal removal were narrow. The Court emphasized the loss of 
mitigating mechanisms through the repeal of INA section 212(c) and 
congressional negation of the ability of sentencing judges to issue a 
Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation, which Justice Stevens 
described as “a critically important procedural protection to minimize 
the risk of unjust deportation.”124 The Court zeroed in on the fact that 
“immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable 
offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh 
consequences of deportation,” with the result that “the drastic 
measure of deportation . . . is now virtually inevitable for a vast 
number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.”125 
Padilla directly speaks to a distinct consequence of modern 
immigration law’s unbending reliance on criminal history — namely, 
that a large number of noncitizens might plead guilty to offenses 
triggering their deportation without adequate notice. It would be 
constitutionally unfair, the Court reasoned, to allow persons to plead 
guilty without being aware that the penalty of deportation would 
follow. Rooted in the Sixth Amendment’s command that criminal 
defendants be afforded adequate assistance of counsel, the decision as 
a technical matter puts constitutional obligations only on criminal 
defense attorneys. As a practical matter, however, the ruling will 
pressure prosecutors and judges to ensure that defense attorneys have 
adequately advised their clients so that convictions cannot be later be 
undone on ineffective assistance grounds.126 
The constitutional holding in Padilla performs equitable work in 
two ways. First, the Court’s regulation of the fairness of noncitizens’ 
plea bargains in criminal court counteracts, to some degree, the special 
risks of unfairness posed in deportation proceedings, which the Court 
cannot so easily regulate.127 Because deportation has long been held 
not to constitute criminal punishment, there is no constitutional right 
to the assistance of counsel in immigration court.128 The Fifth 
 
 124 Id. at 361 (emphasis added); see also Cade, Return of the JRAD, supra note 31, at 
38-41 (discussing Congress’s abrogation of the JRAD). 
 125 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
 126 Cf. Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 501 (2011) (“As a practical matter, state and federal 
prosecutors, and by extension defense lawyers, play an important role in determining 
which noncitizens will be deported permanently or with the possibility of 
administrative relief.”). 
 127 See Christopher N. Lasch, “Crimmigration” and the Right to Counsel at the Border 
Between Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2150 (2014). 
 128 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that 
deportation is not punishment). 
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Amendment requires that deportation procedures satisfy due 
process,129 but, because of a longstanding pattern of extreme judicial 
deference in this area, Congress has enjoyed a virtual blank check 
when it comes to formulating the substantive rules of removal.130 The 
Sixth Amendment right espoused in Padilla thus gives noncitizens a 
form of stand-in protection, operating to guard against the most 
inequitable crime-based deportations — namely, those deportations 
that result from guilty pleas in which the noncitizen’s defense attorney 
failed to give sound advice regarding a critical life choice.131 
The Court also pursued a second equitable goal in Padilla, by 
encouraging actors in the criminal proceedings to evaluate the 
potential immigration consequences in their framing of charges, pleas, 
and sentences.132 As the Court explained: 
By bringing deportation consequences into the process, the 
defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements 
that better satisfy the interests of both parties. As in this case, a 
criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple charges, of 
which only a subset mandate deportation following 
conviction. . . . Counsel . . . may be able to plea bargain 
creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and 
sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding 
a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal 
consequence.133 
 
 129 See Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 
86, 99-100 (1903). 
 130 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713; The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
 131 See Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered 
Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844, 848 (2013); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole 
Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration 
Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 307 (2012); Lasch, supra note 127, at 
2149; Traum, supra note 126, at 529-30. 
 132 See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 
1395 (2011) (“The majority opinion predicts and intends that the Padilla rule will 
change the substantive outcomes of plea bargaining between prosecutors and the 
defense . . . .”); Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: 
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1743 
(2011) (“The purpose of enforcing a duty to advise is not merely to ensure that the 
defendant is aware of the consequences of his or her conviction, but to provide the 
defendant with the opportunity to seek a more desirable result through a plea 
bargain.”). 
 133 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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The relevant equitable frame for decisionmaking — including by 
government lawyers — thus includes not just the criminal sanction 
but also the immigration penalty.134 The Court again underscored the 
“severity of deportation — ‘the equivalent of banishment or exile,’”135 
directly acknowledging the need for a negotiation structure to avert or 
minimize the possibility of removal in appropriate cases. Indeed, this 
appears to be one of the reasons the Court interpreted the Sixth 
Amendment not only to prohibit misadvice, such as that received by 
Padilla, but also to impose an affirmative obligation on counsel to 
provide accurate information about immigration consequences.136 
Thus, Padilla’s Sixth Amendment rule infuses defense attorneys’ 
predictive obligation with a normative character. Attorneys 
representing noncitizens must be knowledgeable about immigration 
law and their client’s circumstances in order to accurately forecast the 
immigration consequences likely to follow the relevant convictions. 
But, in addition, Justice Stevens’s opinion anticipates and even expects 
that defense attorneys will help their clients avoid unjust immigration 
consequences through “creative plea bargaining.”137 Although Padilla 
alone does not elevate that equitable expectation to a mandate, the 
Court’s recent decision in Lafler v. Cooper suggests that defendants are 
constitutionally entitled to the going-rate for plea opportunities in 
their jurisdiction.138 Thus, it may well be that in localities where 
 
 134 See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: 
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1461, 1504 (2011) (“[T]he criminal process is simply the envelope within which the 
potential deportation sanction happens to be packaged.”). 
 135 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-91 
(1947)). 
 136 See id. at 374.  
 137 See Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis, supra note 31, at 1772-75; Bill Ong Hing, The 
Pressure Is On — Criminal Defense Counsel Strategies After Padilla v. Kentucky, 92 
DENV. L. REV. 835, 835 (2015) (arguing that defense counsel should engage strategies 
to avoid or minimize the immigration consequences of convictions for lawfully 
present noncitizens); Rebecca Sharpless, Clear and Simple Deportation Rules for Crimes: 
Why We Need Them and Why It’s Hard to Get Them, 92 DENV. L. REV. 933, 934 (2015) 
(arguing that “the Padilla duty requires defense attorneys to . . . attempt to negotiate 
immigration-safe pleas”). 
 138 See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012) (holding that “loss of the 
plea opportunity” that defendant “would have received in the ordinary course” fell 
below constitutional standards of representation); see also Bowers, Baselines, supra 
note 17, at 1105 (arguing that as a consequence of Lafler and Missouri v. Frye, courts 
must consider “party-driven ‘practice law’” to evaluate whether defendant received 
what he would have “in the ordinary course” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment 
analysis); Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2560, 2660-65 
(2013) (arguing that the Court’s recent plea bargaining cases provide support “for a 
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immigration-specific plea-bargaining is or becomes standard practice, 
defense attorneys who fail to competently engage in such bargaining 
will fall below constitutional minimums.139 
Undoubtedly, in particular jurisdictions or with particular 
prosecutors, it might not be fruitful for a defense lawyer to focus 
attention on the client’s immigration status. Many prosecutors 
disagree that immigration consequences are relevant to the criminal 
charge whatsoever, while others may view deportation of noncitizen 
defendants as a desirable outcome.140 But many prosecutors — in part 
because they routinely make equity-driven charging and plea-
bargaining choices — may well consider assessment of severe direct or 
collateral consequences to be part of their duty to see that justice is 
done.141 As the norms of Padilla become internalized in the criminal 
justice system over time, bargaining over deportation consequences 
may well become commonplace.142 The overarching message of Padilla 
 
constitutional right to effective bargaining,” judged by “counsel’s success or failure in 
following prevailing professional norms”). 
 139 See Bowers, Baselines, supra note 17, at 1105-06 (suggesting that the Court’s 
recent plea bargain cases may entitle criminal defendants to “‘creative’ bargaining that 
is designed to circumvent legally permissible trial charges and sentences”); Josh 
Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1153-54, 1159-60 
(2013); Roberts, supra note 138, at 2668. 
 140 See, e.g., Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of 
Justice for Non-Citizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 28-32 (2012) (presenting data on 
range of attitudes in Brooklyn district attorney’s office regarding appropriateness of 
taking immigration consequences into account during plea bargaining); Brown, supra 
note 132, at 1400-02 (arguing that prosecutors are unlikely to be sympathetic or to 
enjoy much charging leeway in high-volume drug trafficking cases); Eagly, Criminal 
Justice for Noncitizens, supra note 80, at 1156-96 (discussing three prosecutors’ offices 
where alienage is variously treated as a neutral or negative factor); Eisha Jain, 
Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197 (2016) (discussing the 
structural incentives that lead prosecutors to influence collateral consequences). 
 141 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 26; LIPSKY, supra note 41, at 22 (discussing 
prosecutors’ use of alternative charges to avert harsh mandatory drug sentences where 
unjustified by the defendants actual circumstances); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 
25, at 1686-87 (discussing the greater deference prosecutors receive in determining 
what to charge); Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum, supra note 25, at 1435 (discussing 
efforts by The Sentencing Commission to restrain prosecutorial discretion). 
 142 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 140, at 34-35 (arguing that professional 
responsibility standards and proportionality concerns do or will lead many 
prosecutors to individually evaluate justifiability of deportation); Eagly, Criminal 
Justice for Noncitizens, supra note 80, at 1156-96 (discussing prosecutors’ offices with 
charging policies that benefit noncitizens); Robert M. A. Johnson, A Prosecutor’s 
Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011) 
(arguing that Padilla will directly and indirectly influence prosecutors’ consideration 
of collateral consequences, presenting an opportunity to both do “justice and improve 
public safety”).  
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— a message both accurate and practically significant — is that 
immigration enforcement is now highly dependent on the outcome of 
criminal law and process. In such a world, it makes little sense for 
prosecutorial officials (or the judges with whom those officials 
routinely interact) to turn a blind eye to the immigration 
consequences of prosecutorial decisions. Until Congress rolls back the 
breadth and reach of criminal deportation rules, the burden of helping 
the system achieve proportionality will fall heavily on criminal-justice-
system actors, a reality that the Court plainly envisioned in Padilla.143 
2. Preserving Deals and Discretion 
If one goal of Padilla was to create opportunities for noncitizen 
defendants to reach plea deals that avoid deportation or that preserve 
possibilities for equitable discretionary relief in later deportation 
proceedings, still other cases decided over the last decade have worked 
toward the same objective by narrowing the range of criminal 
convictions that trigger mandatory removal. These decisions primarily 
have involved challenges to the immigration consequences of drug 
convictions that, while given lenient treatment under state law, were 
charged as aggravated felony deportation grounds by ICE prosecutors 
in efforts to foreclose the possibility of equitable relief.144 The Roberts 
Court has repeatedly rejected these efforts by stringently requiring a 
categorical match between the elements of the criminal offense and the 
removal ground.145 Through these cases, the Court has reigned in the 
harshest interpretations of the criminal removal provisions and 
 
 143 See Hing, supra note 137, at 835 (arguing that the constitutional duty of Padilla 
places “tremendous pressure on defense counsel”); Sharpless, supra note 137, at 934 
(discussing the duties of defense attorneys in light of the decision in Padilla); cf. Stacy 
Caplow, Governors! Seize the Law: A Call to Expand the Use of Pardons to Provide Relief 
from Deportation, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 293 (2013) (arguing that governors should 
pardon noncitizens in appropriate cases in order to remove the prospect of 
deportation). 
 144 Aggravated felonies make noncitizens subject to mandatory detention, ineligible 
for discretionary relief from deportation, and permanently prohibited from lawful 
return to the U.S. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (2012) (aggravated felony bar to lawful admission to the 
United States); id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (aggravated felony bar to asylum and 
withholding of removal); id. § 1229b(a)(3) (aggravated felony bar to cancellation of 
removal for LPRs); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (aggravated felony bar to cancellation of 
removal for non-LPRs). 
 145 Two notable exceptions from the general thrust of this strict categorical 
approach, Nijhawan v. Holder and Torres v. Lynch, are discussed below. See infra text 
accompanying notes 207–14. 
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safeguarded at least limited opportunities for equitable 
decisionmaking in deportation proceedings. 
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,146 for example, decided during the 
same term as Padilla, the government pressed the argument that 
Carachuri-Rosendo’s two minor state-law drug possession crimes 
would have made him a felony recidivist drug offender under the 
Controlled Substances Act, had he been federally prosecuted.147 A 
federal recidivist drug conviction would be deemed an aggravated 
felony, thereby disqualifying Carachuri-Rosendo from cancellation of 
removal or other discretionary relief. Carachuri-Rosendo conceded his 
deportability for a controlled substance violation, but argued that the 
aggravated felony ground of removal was inappropriate since he had 
not actually been charged as a recidivist.148 
As in Padilla, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court began by 
cataloguing Carachuri-Rosendo’s longstanding ties to the United 
States, along with other facts that nudged the scales in favor of 
leniency.149 The Court then framed Carachuri-Rosendo’s criminal 
history in a sympathetic light: “Like so many in this country, 
Carachuri-Rosendo has gotten into some trouble with our drug 
laws.”150 The Court noted, however, that petty simple possession does 
not comport with the “‘everyday understanding’” of what it means to 
engage in drug trafficking.151 Indeed, the Court found the 
government’s characterization of “unauthorized possession of a trivial 
amount of a prescription drug” as an aggravated felony to be, “to say 
the least, counterintuitive and ‘unorthodox,’” especially when the 
defendant had received only a 10-day sentence.152 Endorsing a 
“‘common sense conception’” of the statute, the Court declared it was 
“very wary” — in fact, “doubly wary” — of the government’s 
position.153 
 
 146 560 U.S. 563 (2010). 
 147 See id. at 575-78. 
 148 See id. at 571. 
 149 See id. at 570-71. 
 150 Id. at 570. 
 151 Id. at 574. 
 152 Id. (citing Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)); see also Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 35, Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. 563 (No. 09-60) (Justice Ginsburg 
commenting that the INA should not be read to require the “absurd result” that 
noncitizens convicted of minor drug possession crimes be deported and “never, ever 
darken our doors again”). 
 153 Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 573-75 (citing to Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 
(2006) and Black’s Law Dictionary). 
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The Court then emphasized the appropriateness of a “categorical 
inquiry” in determining immigration consequences of criminal 
offenses, noting that the deportation statute requires that the 
noncitizen be “convicted of an aggravated felony.”154 In Carachuri-
Rosendo’s case, the court record for his second offense — the 
government-posited recidivist (and thus aggravated) felony conviction 
— contained “no finding of the fact of his prior drug offense.”155 
Furthermore, the Court noted, had Carachuri-Rosendo in fact been 
prosecuted in federal court as a felony recidivist, he would have been 
entitled to “mandatory notice and process requirements,” as well as an 
opportunity to contest the validity of the predicate conviction.156 The 
government argued these procedural protections were “meaningless,” 
or in any event could be satisfied with comparable procedures in 
immigration court (for example, with an opportunity to contest the 
earlier conviction). As it had done in Padilla, however, the Court took 
a realistic view of the limited procedural protections afforded in 
deportation proceedings, rejecting these arguments.157 
Carachuri-Rosendo revealed the Court again focusing on the need to 
preserve prosecutorial discretion in the conviction-to-removal 
pipeline. The federal procedural prerequisites, Justice Stevens 
emphasized, allow prosecutors to choose, in the exercise of discretion, 
whether to seek a recidivist enhancement.158 Many state codes afford 
state prosecutors similar discretion.159 Allowing immigration judges to 
apply their own recidivist enhancements, Justice Stevens found, 
“would denigrate the independent judgment of state prosecutors.”160 
Indeed, as the Court observed, in Carachuri-Rosendo’s own criminal 
case, “the prosecutor specifically elected to ‘[a]bandon’ a recidivist 
enhancement under state law.”161 One can only speculate on the 
prosecutor’s motives for doing so, but the Court’s ruling ensured that 
such actions by government attorneys will impact the ensuing 
immigration proceedings. The Court’s analysis means that criminal 
 
 154 Id. at 576 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted); id. at 580. 
 155 Id. at 576.  
 156 Id. at 578. 
 157 See id. at 578-80.  
 158 See id. at 579. 
 159 See id. 
 160 Id. at 579-80; see also Traum, supra note 126, at 529 (“The prosecutor’s decision 
to pursue a recidivist enhancement, the Court explained, is equivalent to a charging 
decision, i.e., it is not automatic but a calculated choice by the prosecutor, which must 
be afforded deference.”). 
 161 Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 579-80.  
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court outcomes of this sort will have predictable immigration 
consequences, including the preservation of narrow opportunities for 
discretionary relief. 
The Court took much the same approach in Moncrieffe v. Holder.162 
Adrian Moncrieffe, a lawful permanent resident with two U.S. citizen 
children, “came to the United States legally in 1984, when he was 
three.”163 In 2007, Moncrieffe was stopped while driving in Georgia 
and arrested for possessing 1.3 grams of marijuana (about two or three 
cigarettes’ worth).164 He later pleaded guilty as first-time offender to 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.165 ICE asserted that 
Moncrieffe’s conviction166 triggered the “illicit trafficking” aggravated 
felony ground of removal.167 The immigration judge agreed, and 
Moncrieffe’s order of deportation was upheld by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the Fifth Circuit.168 
The Court rejected the government’s position, with seven Justices in 
the majority, thus opening the door for a discretionary judgment by an 
immigration judge about the justifiability of Moncrieffe’s deportation. 
The Court found that Moncrieffe’s state conviction did not adequately 
map onto a federal offense constituting an aggravated felony. Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinion for the majority emphasized, with even more 
clarity than the Court had provided in prior cases, the categorical 
analysis that should be employed to determine the immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions. To trigger deportation under 
this approach, a state offense must be a “categorical match” with the 
relevant federal offense, and a “state offense is a categorical match 
with a generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state offense 
 
 162 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).  
 163 Id. at 1683; see also Brief for Petitioner at 4, Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (No. 11-
702) (discussing Moncrieffe’s life in the United States). 
 164 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683. For an argument that Moncrieffe was racially 
profiled, see Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the 
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 MICH. J.L. REFORM 
967, 993-96 (2015).  
 165 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2007) 
(providing the statute under which Moncrieffe was charged).  
 166 Moncrieffe’s status as a first-time offender meant that the court withheld 
entering a conviction or imposing jail time, with the result that if Moncrieffe 
successfully completed a five-year probationary period his charge would be expunged 
altogether. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-60(a) (1997). However, the INA requires such 
dispositions continue to be treated as convictions for purposes of deportation 
consequences. See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 675-76. 
 167 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012). 
 168 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d and 
remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).  
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necessarily involved . . . facts equating to the generic federal 
offense.”169 The noncitizen’s actual conduct, the Court explained, “is 
quite irrelevant” to the categorical approach.170 Instead, courts “must 
presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least 
of the acts criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts 
are encompassed by the generic federal offense.”171 Put simply, if the 
state statute criminalizes conduct that is broader than the generic 
federal offense referenced in the INA, there is a categorically 
insufficient match between the offenses to warrant imposition of the 
relevant removal ground. 
Under federal law, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute 
constitutes a felony, punishable by five years imprisonment, except 
that possession with intent to distribute only a small amount of 
marijuana for no remuneration is punishable only as a 
misdemeanor.172 In Moncrieffe, the government had argued that this 
exception did not serve to define the elements of the federal offense, 
but rather operated only as a mitigating sentencing factor.173 Indeed, 
as a practical matter it seems that defendants prosecuted under the 
marijuana distribution statute in federal criminal court bear the 
burden to prove to the sentencing judge that the misdemeanor 
sentencing exception should apply.174 The government argued that a 
similar approach could be followed in immigration proceedings, with 
state distribution convictions treated by default as aggravated felonies 
unless the noncitizen can prove the mitigating factors to the 
immigration judge.175 
The Court found the government’s approach would cast the 
deportation net too wide, subjecting noncitizens whose conduct was 
not egregious to a mandatory removal category.176 Some state-law 
marijuana distribution convictions would unambiguously correspond 
only with federal misdemeanors, involving just a small amount of 
marijuana and no remuneration. The Court found untenable the 
 
 169 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1680 (internal quotation marks and alteration marks 
omitted).  
 170 Id. at 1684 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 171 Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted).  
 172 See id. at 1685-86 (discussing 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) and 812(c)). 
 173 See id. at 1687; see also id. at 1698 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“As the Court notes, 
every Court of Appeals to consider the question has held that § 841(a) is the default 
offense and that § 841(b)(4) is only a mitigating sentencing guideline.”). 
 174 See id. at 1687-88 (majority opinion). 
 175 See id. at 1690. 
 176 See id. at 1689 (discussing a New York statute criminalizing only the 
distribution of a small amount of marijuana for remuneration). 
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government’s proposed “minitrial” approach to mitigation. In doing 
so, the majority relied in part on the statutory language, but it also 
evinced a functional, real-world understanding of the deficiencies of 
immigration court procedures. The Court emphasized the unfairness 
of asking noncitizens to “locate witnesses years after the fact, 
notwithstanding that during removal proceedings noncitizens are not 
guaranteed legal representation and are often subject to mandatory 
detention.”177 The Court’s insistence on a strict categorical approach 
in Moncrieffe thus not only promoted efficiency and predictability, but 
also took account of fairness concerns that confront individuals 
targeted for deportation.178 
Notably, the Court concluded its opinion in Moncrieffe by chiding 
the Government for its overzealous approach to the criminal 
deportation provisions: 
This is the third time in seven years that we have considered 
whether the Government has properly characterized a low-
level drug offense as “illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance,” and thus an “aggravated felony.” Once again we 
hold that the Government’s approach defies “the 
commonsense conception” of these terms. 179 
Justice Sotomayor’s message was clear: the Court believes the 
executive’s approach to the removal of LPRs with minor criminal 
history has been unduly aggressive.180 
In Mellouli v. Lynch,181 decided in 2015, the Court once again 
rejected the government’s scorched-earth approach to seeking the 
deportation of LPRs with minor drug crimes. Following an arrest for 
 
 177 See id. at 1690. Noncitizens presumably would need to present witnesses to 
testify that no cash changed hands when the drug was distributed, as lack of 
remuneration would make the offense punishable as a federal misdemeanor. 
 178 Cf. Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical 
Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 1032 (2008) (“While 
it is reasonable to expect noncitizens to be on notice regarding the immigration 
consequences of the facts necessary to the offense, it is unreasonable to expect 
noncitizens to be on notice that facts outside the elements of the crime will later be 
used against them.”); see also Das, supra note 132, at 1727-42 (detailing the benefits of 
deviating from a categorical analysis approach). 
 179 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 
563, 573 (2010)). 
 180 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 101 (arguing 
that Moncrieffe and Carachuri-Rosendo “demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to subject 
long-term lawful permanent residents of the United States to . . . mandatory removal 
based on relatively small-time drug convictions”). 
 181 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). 
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driving offenses, Moones Mellouli was held in detention and officers 
discovered four Adderall pills in his sock.182 As a result, the state 
charged Mellouli with trafficking contraband in jail.183 A deal was later 
struck, and the amended complaint to which Mellouli pleaded guilty 
charged only the lesser offense of possessing drug paraphernalia — to 
wit, a sock — and did not identify the substance that the officers had 
seized.184 Nevertheless, ICE pursued Mellouli’s removal, predicated on 
the controlled substance ground, and in fact deported him.185 
Although Mellouli had been lawfully present in the United States since 
2004 and had established significant ties in his community,186 he was 
ineligible to seek discretionary cancellation of removal because he had 
not accrued sufficient continuous presence in lawful status at the time 
of his arrest and conviction.187 
In a 7–2 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that 
Mellouli’s drug paraphernalia conviction was not a removable offense. 
First, the Court noted that federal law does not criminalize simple 
possession of drug paraphernalia.188 In addition, federal law defines 
drug paraphernalia, for purposes of non-possessory crimes such as 
production or trafficking, as “any ‘equipment, product, or material’ 
which is ‘primarily intended or designed for use’ in connection with 
various drug-related activities,” in contrast to “common household or 
ready-to-wear items like socks.”189 Justice Ginsburg also observed that 
in 19 states Mellouli’s conduct would not even have been deemed a 
criminal offense.190 
 
 182 See id. at 1985. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. 
 186 See id. at 1984-85 (noting that Mellouli entered the U.S. on a student visa in 
2004, earned undergraduate and graduate degrees with distinction, taught 
mathematics at University of Missouri-Columbia, became an LPR in 2011, and is 
engaged to a U.S. citizen). 
 187 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a), (d) (2012) 
(requiring, inter alia, that noncitizens seeking cancellation of removal have five years 
in LPR status and seven years continuous residence after lawful admission, and 
specifying that initiation of removal proceedings or commission of a removable 
criminal offense will stop the accrual of time for purposes of establishing presence or 
residence). 
 188 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985. 
 189 Id. 
 190 See id. (“At most, it is a low-level infraction, often not attended by a right to 
counsel.”). 
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Once again underscoring the necessity of a categorical approach to 
analyzing the immigration consequences of criminal convictions,191 
the Court noted that the INA’s controlled-substance ground of 
removal applies only to noncitizens “convicted of a violation of . . . 
any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined 
in section 802 of Title 21).”192 Immigration officials’ theory for 
Mellouli’s deportability was that “a paraphernalia conviction ‘relates 
to’ any and all controlled substances, whether or not federally listed, 
with which the paraphernalia can be used.”193 The Court, however, 
concluded that this theory of deportability “finds no home” in the 
statutory text and “leads to consequences Congress could not have 
intended.”194 In particular, the Court was troubled by the “anomalous 
result” that minor paraphernalia offenses could trigger removal more 
easily than offenses based on the actual possession or distribution of 
drugs, since those offenses support removal only if they involve a 
federally controlled substance.195 
The Court also rejected an alternative rationale urged by the 
government to support Mellouli’s removability, which Justice 
Thomas’s dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Alito) largely 
endorsed.196 The government argued that because there is 
“substantial[] overlap” between Kansas’s drug schedule and the federal 
schedules, the state statute could reasonably be construed to be 
“related to” federally controlled drugs.197 The Court, however, found 
this construction of the statute unacceptable, because it would trigger 
deportation based on state convictions even where no federally 
controlled offense was involved.198 Justice Ginsburg hammered on the 
 
 191 See id. at 1985-87.  
 192 Id. at 1981-82; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 193 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1982 (quoting and citing Martinez Espinoza, 25 I.&N. 
Dec. 118 (2009)). As the Eighth Circuit put it, Mellouli’s conviction “‘relates to’ a 
federally controlled substance because it is a crime . . . ‘associated with the drug trade 
in general.’” Id. at 1988-89. 
 194 See id. at 1989 (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013)). 
 195 See id. (“The incongruous upshot is that an alien is not removable for 
possessing a substance controlled only under Kansas law, but he is removable for 
using a sock to contain that substance.”). 
 196 Id.; see also id. at 1991-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For Justice Thomas, the 
“relating to” language in the removal statute should be interpreted broadly, and 
“faithfully applying that text means that an alien may be deported for committing an 
offense that does not involve a federally controlled substance.” Id. at 1991-95. 
 197 Id. at 1989 (majority opinion). 
 198 See id. at 1990 (observing that “the Government’s construction of the federal 
removal statute stretches to the breaking point, reaching state-court convictions, like 
Mellouli’s, in which ‘[no] controlled substance (as defined in [§ 802])’ figures as an 
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need for categorical analysis, explaining that drug-crime-based 
removals require “a direct link between an alien’s crime of conviction 
and a particular federally controlled drug.”199 The government’s 
approach would break that link, sweeping in offenses with only “some 
general relation” to federally controlled substances.200 
Notably, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the majority recognized, 
with apparent approval, Professor Jennifer Koh’s observation that the 
categorical approach enables noncitizens “to enter ‘safe harbor’ guilty 
pleas” that avoid immigration sanctions.201 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg 
conjectured, Mellouli’s own plea may have involved just such an 
effort, in light of the deal struck and the amended complaint’s 
omission of the nature of the discovered pills in Mellouli’s sock.202 As 
it had done in Padilla, then, the Court in Mellouli again endorsed the 
appropriateness of plea-bargain deals that help noncitizens avoid 
removal when significant equities support their continued residence in 
the United States.203 Moreover, in Mellouli the Court went a step 
further than it had in the earlier criminal removal cases, employing 
categorical analysis to reach a result that would completely avert the 
possibility that Mr. Mellouli would be deported on the basis of the 
conviction at issue, rather than merely preserve the possibility of back-
end equitable relief. 
 
*** 
 
Mellouli and the Court’s other recent crime-based-deportation 
rulings work hand-in-glove with Padilla to inject considerations of 
individual fairness into the deportation process. Padilla pushes defense 
attorneys to seek safe harbors for their noncitizen clients, and 
prosecutors to weigh immigration-law consequences in exercising 
their discretion to strike individualized plea deals. At the same time, 
decisions like Mellouli help insulate criminal court deals against the 
federal government’s indiscriminate approach with respect to 
noncitizens with criminal history. In similar fashion, decisions such as 
 
element of the offense”). 
 199 See id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See id. at 1987 (quoting and citing Koh, supra note 131, at 295-310).  
 202 Id. at 1987 n.5. 
 203 See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1492 n.10 (“Armed with knowledge 
that a guilty plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas might endeavor to 
negotiate a plea to a nonexcludable offense — in Vartelas’s case, e.g., possession of 
counterfeit securities . . . .”). 
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Carachuri-Rosendo and Moncrieffe broaden opportunities for plea 
agreements that at least enable the defendant to seek discretionary 
relief from removal, notwithstanding Congress’s efforts to rein in the 
availability of such relief. Finally, strict and consistent application of 
the Court’s categorical approach also makes it possible for defense 
counsel to provide clear and accurate advice about immigration 
consequences in criminal proceedings.204 
It must be acknowledged that the Court has recently made a 
concerted effort to implement the categorical approach more strictly in 
the sentencing context as well.205 But that fact does not diminish the 
significance of the case law discussed in this Part for the deportation 
system, and it certainly was not inevitable that the Court would align 
its analysis of determining the consequences of prior convictions in 
both systems.206 
Before turning to the next group of immigration decisions, I should 
clarify that although the Court has generally required categorical 
analysis as a means of injecting equity into the removal system, it has 
departed from the strict categorical approach in a few cases. Thus, in 
Nijhawan v. Holder, the Court determined that the monetary-loss 
portion of aggravated felony provision concerning “fraud or deceit in 
which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000” required 
inquiry into the specific circumstances surrounding an offender’s 
commission of the crime, regardless of whether the amount of loss was 
a necessary element of the underlying conviction.207 As the Court later 
 
 204 See Das, supra note 132, at 1745 (arguing that the watering down of the 
categorical approach “creates tensions within the criminal justice system, disrupting 
defense counsel’s ability to advise immigrant clients meaningfully and complicating 
the ability of all the actors in the system who want to seek more appropriate outcomes 
through plea-bargaining”); Koh, supra note 131, at 298 (“The fairness concerns 
associated with the categorical approach take on particular urgency in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which affirmed the ethical duty of 
criminal defense counsel to accurately advise noncitizen defendants of the 
immigration consequences following a guilty plea.”). 
 205 See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (reaffirming and 
clarifying the use of the categorical approach to determine the sentencing 
consequences of a prior conviction); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 
(2013) (same); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (same). 
 206 See, e.g., Silva-Trevino, 24 I.&N. Dec. 687, 704 (A.G. 2008) (opinion by 
Attorney General Mukasey directing immigration judges to consider “any additional 
evidence” where the categorical approach fails to show that a particular conviction 
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude), vacated, Silva-Trevino, 26 I.&N. Dec. 
550 (A.G. 2015); Das, supra note 132 (pointing out the immigration agency’s 
divergence from the categorical approach in immigration law and the courts’ failure to 
adequately correct that path). 
 207 See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009). 
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noted in Mellouli, however, the particular statutory ground at issue in 
Nijhawan was “atypical.”208 If strict categorical analysis had been 
employed, the relevant deportation provisions would have had 
extremely limited and inconsistent application, thwarting Congress’s 
intent. 
More recently, in Torres v. Lynch, a five-Justice majority of the Court 
held that, despite its recent emphasis on a strict categorical approach, 
state offenses need not contain an interstate commerce element in 
order to trigger the various aggravated felony removal grounds that are 
defined in the immigration code by way of cross-reference to federal 
offenses in which such jurisdictional element is required.209 Torres 
was convicted of a state arson offense that did not require any 
connection to interstate commerce, but which otherwise satisfied the 
elements of a federal arson and explosives statute that the INA 
incorporates as an aggravated felony ground.210 
Although the Court upheld the government’s position, and softened 
the categorical approach with respect to the jurisdictional element, the 
decision does not break from the general thrust of the Court’s recent 
deportation jurisprudence and its focus on proportionality. Indeed, 
Justice Kagan’s opinion for the majority took pains to explain why a 
rule that does not require state crimes to contain the interstate 
commerce element contained in the corresponding federal offenses 
that define many of the aggravated felony categories will result in the 
best overall match between serious noncitizen offenders and 
banishment.211 Were Torres’s arguments to prevail, the Court found, 
noncitizens who commit various egregious crimes (e.g., child 
pornography offenses) would not be automatically removable as 
aggravated felons, while others who engage in much more minor 
crimes (e.g., operating an unlawful gambling business) still would. 
And those anomalous results would follow merely from whether a 
state chooses to create an interstate commerce element for the crime. 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Thomas 
and Breyer, would have interpreted the INA in a way that casts the 
 
 208 See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 n.3. 
 209 See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1634 (2016). 
 210 See id. at 1623-24. 
 211 See id. at 1627-30. To the extent that some applications of the aggravated felony 
categories triggered by state offenses lacking an interstate commerce element would 
sweep too broadly in individual cases, Chief Justice Roberts suggested at oral 
argument that a permissible solution would be for the attorney general to exercise 
discretion and “not . . . subject the alien to removal in the first place . . . .” Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 44-45, Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2015) (No. 14-1096), 
2015 WL 9919328. 
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reach of some of the aggravated felony grounds more narrowly, by 
strictly requiring nonfederal statutes to contain an interstate 
commerce element if the federal statute referred to in the applicable 
deportation ground also contains such an element.212 Justice 
Sotomayor emphasized the fact that convictions deemed aggravated 
felonies deprive immigration judges of the authority to set aside 
removal where, on balance, an individual’s positive equities and ties 
outweigh the sanction of deportation.213 Torres, himself, she noted, 
appeared to otherwise be eligible for cancellation of removal. The 
dissenting opinion recognized that strict application of the categorical 
approach would allow some serious offenders to evade particular 
removal grounds. Justice Sotomayor pointed out, however, that such 
risk is mitigated because many such convictions would also fall into 
the generic “crime of violence” aggravated felony removal category, 
which does not contain the jurisdictional interstate-commerce hook, 
or within other removal categories for which discretionary relief 
would be possible but not likely granted.214 
At the end of the day, the Torres majority was uncomfortable with 
an interpretation of the aggravated felony provision that would have 
made it more difficult for the government to remove some very serious 
noncitizen offenders. The dissenters, in contrast, would have drawn 
the line in a different place, preserving more possibilities for 
immigration judges to consider individual equities and circumstances 
in determining the appropriateness of deportation. The take-away is 
that both the majority and dissenting opinions in Torres reflect the 
Justices’ continuing concern with proportionality in the operation of 
immigration laws, including for noncitizens with criminal histories. 
Importantly, though, Torres shows that the Court’s proportionality 
concerns are not necessarily a one-way ratchet. While the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area largely works to increase structural 
possibilities for noncitizens to avoid removal, the equities add up 
differently, at least for a majority of the Justices, when it comes to the 
deportation of egregious criminal offenders. 
C. Arbitrary and Capricious Charging Discretion 
Judulang v. Holder,215 handed down in 2011, has received less 
academic scrutiny than other recent deportation decisions. Although 
 
 212 See Torres, 136 S. Ct. at 1634 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 213 See id. at 1634-35. 
 214 See id. at 1636-38. 
 215 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
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the case involved an unusual set of facts, some aspects of the Court’s 
decision may prove to be influential. 
Like St. Cyr, the Judulang case concerned INA section 212(c), the 
discretionary relief provision repealed in 1996. To understand the 
Court’s ruling, one must know something about the background 
statutory structure. Section 212(c) was located in the inadmissibility 
section of the INA, and therefore did not clearly authorize 
immigration judges to set aside deportation grounds for equitable 
reasons. After much litigation, primarily involving challenges on equal 
protection grounds, the BIA adopted a policy of extending 212(c) 
discretionary relief to noncitizens facing deportation on criminal 
grounds, but only if the deportation ground with which they were 
charged had a comparable inadmissibility ground in the INA.216 The 
vast majority of circuits then upheld this “comparable grounds” 
approach as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.217 
In Judulang, a unanimous Court found this agency practice to be an 
“arbitrary and capricious” restriction on eligibility for relief from 
removal, thereby violating the Administrative Procedures Act.218 The 
Court emphasized that agency practices with respect to a noncitizen’s 
eligibility for discretionary relief must be tied to “the purposes of the 
immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration 
system.”219 Justice Kagan, who authored the majority decision, never 
explicitly defined these “purposes” or what is meant by the 
“appropriate operation” of the deportation system. Nevertheless, the 
opinion evidences the Court’s clear discomfort with a deportation 
system that allows agency officials to exercise prosecutorial discretion 
without regard to the “alien’s fitness to remain in the country.”220 
Throughout the opinion, the Court focused on the need to connect 
agency policies regarding criminal noncitizens’ eligibility for 
 
 216 See id. at 480-82. 
 217 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 91-93 
(describing Judulang as “a stinging rebuke of the BIA’s reasoning and the U.S. 
government’s defense of it”).  
 218 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485, 487; see also Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: 
How Judulang Limits Executive Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens 
Channels for Future Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 48 (2012) (contending that 
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review of immigration policy to a more rigorous and independent review of the 
policy’s merits”). 
 219 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485; see also id. at 487 (observing that the agency’s 
comparable grounds approach to 212(c) relief has “no connection to the goals of the 
deportation process or the rational operation of the immigration laws”). 
 220 Id. at 484-85. 
  
2017] Judging Immigration Equity 1073 
discretionary relief to the actual merits of deportation in individual 
cases. Justice Kagan opined that the agency’s comparable-grounds 
approach “does not rest on any factors relevant to whether an alien . . . 
should be deported”221 and “has nothing to do with whether a 
deportable alien . . . merits the ability to seek a waiver.”222 In fact, the 
agency’s methodology for determining whether a noncitizen may 
qualify for relief “is as extraneous to the merits of the case as a coin 
flip would be.”223 This, the Court found, is because the 
correspondence (or not) of a charged deportation ground with a 
ground of inadmissibility is arbitrary. The Court explained that the 
government’s approach to deciding who may seek discretionary relief 
must take into account “the alien’s prior offense or his other attributes 
and circumstances.”224 The ruling thus again signaled the importance 
of normative balancing and proportionality in the agency’s 
implementation of the deportation statute. 
The Court appeared particularly troubled by the tendency of this 
agency scheme to allow discretionary charging decisions by individual 
immigration prosecutors to bring about arbitrary or capricious 
results.225 As Justice Kagan explained, “underneath this layer of 
arbitrariness lies yet another, because the outcome of the Board’s 
comparable-grounds analysis itself may rest on the happenstance of an 
immigration official’s charging decision.”226 This possibility obtains 
because a noncitizen’s conviction often may fall within several of the 
INA’s deportation grounds. Accordingly, front-line ICE attorneys have 
significant flexibility in determining which of several deportation 
grounds to pursue, much like the discretion a prosecutor enjoys when 
determining which criminal charges to levy against particular 
defendants. 
Coupled with the Board’s comparable-grounds approach to 212(c) 
relief, this unencumbered discretion allowed the agency’s trial 
attorneys to foreclose, simply through optional charging decisions, 
any possibility of relief. In Judulang’s case, for example, his conviction 
 
 221 Id. at 487 (emphasis added); see also id. at 485 (“Rather than considering factors 
that might be thought germane to the deportation decision, that policy hinges 
§ 212(c) eligibility on an irrelevant statutory comparison between statutory 
provisions.”). 
 222 Id. at 485 (emphasis added). 
 223 See id. at 485-86. 
 224 See id. at 485. 
 225 I briefly highlighted this aspect of Judulang in previous work. See Jason A. Cade, 
Deporting the Pardoned, 46 UC DAVIS L. REV. 355, 416 (2012) [hereinafter Deporting the 
Pardoned]. 
 226 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 486. 
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for voluntary manslaughter fell within both the “crime involving 
moral turpitude” deportation ground and the “crime of violence” 
aggravated felony deportation ground. Because immigration officials 
charged him under the latter provision, rather than just the former, he 
was deemed ineligible for 212(c) discretionary relief under the 
comparable grounds approach, as there is no ground of inadmissibility 
that corresponds with the crime of violence aggravated felony 
category. Justice Kagan highlighted the injustice of hinging a 
noncitizen’s right to remain on an individual immigration prosecutor’s 
charging decision: “An alien appearing before one official may suffer 
deportation; an identically situated alien appearing before another may 
gain the right to stay in the country.”227 
Despite the complexity and idiosyncrasy of the particular scheme at 
issue, the most important take-away from Judulang is the Court’s 
willingness to employ arbitrary-and-capricious administrative review 
to tether the “rational operation of the immigration laws” to a 
charging scheme that focuses on the “merits of the case.”228 Read 
broadly, Judulang suggests that charging decisions that arbitrarily 
deprive a noncitizen of any possibility of equitable relief may be 
subject to judicial scrutiny. It remains to be seen whether the Court, 
or lower courts, will apply the reasoning of Judulang to weigh 
challenges to other discretionary charging policies in deportation 
proceedings that affect a noncitizen’s ability to present mitigating 
equities.229 Such situations do exist. For example, ICE officials have 
the discretionary authority to choose among alternative removal 
charges in a way that, as the statute has been interpreted, can render 
gubernatorial or Presidential pardons either effective or ineffective in 
the immigration context.230 Even more commonly, discretionary 
charging decisions can determine whether non-LPRs are channeled to 
expedited removal proceedings where they enjoy fewer procedural 
protections and defenses to removal.231 
 
 227 Id.  
 228 Id. at 485-87. 
 229 Cf. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-92 (1999) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s first amendment challenge to selective immigration enforcement). 
 230 See Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, supra note 225, at 373-78 (discussing this 
phenomenon and arguing that Judulang might support a challenge to immigration 
charging decisions that arbitrarily render gubernatorial pardons ineffective).  
 231 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 218, at 59-74 (discussing this phenomenon and 
arguing that Judulang might facilitate challenges to an ICE officer’s decision to put 
non-LPRs with aggravated felony convictions into administrative expedited removal 
proceedings, which provide even weaker protections than regular deportation 
proceedings). On expedited removal generally, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise 
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At the least, Judulang provides further evidence of the Court’s 
continuing concern about the lack of adjudicative discretion in the 
deportation system, particularly when the government seeks to 
constrict even further the already-much-narrowed possibilities for 
individual balancing that remain in the code.232 
D. The Second-Look Cases 
Another series of recent Supreme Court decisions work toward 
equitable ends by protecting noncitizens’ procedural rights in 
immigration court. In the face of legislative and executive efforts to 
restrict noncitizens’ ability to obtain judicial review and other means 
of challenging removal orders,233 the Court has issued a number of 
decisions interpreting the statute to preserve noncitizens’ ability to 
reopen proceedings. These second-look cases thus help safeguard 
opportunities for noncitizens to present claims for relief from removal 
after the completion of their administrative immigration 
proceedings.234 
Consider 2008’s Dada v. Mukasey.235 An immigration judge granted 
Samson Dada voluntary departure, a statutory benefit allowing him to 
avoid the consequences of a deportation order but requiring him to 
depart the country to Nigeria within thirty days.236 Near the end of 
that period, Dada filed a timely motion to reopen his removal 
proceedings in order to present evidence that he was married to a U.S. 
citizen, thus providing a basis for adjustment of status.237 Dada, 
however, found himself in a bind. The motion to reopen would take 
 
of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2015).  
 232 But see Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of 
Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 403-07 (2013) 
(arguing that the Court resolved Judulang on administrative law principles in order to 
avoid having to recognize constitutional rights of noncitizens).  
 233 See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial 
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997); Traum, supra note 
126, at 516 & n.148. 
 234 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 77 
(“Noncitizens subject to removal from the United States regularly file motions to 
reopen, seeking among other things, to present new evidence in support of claims for 
relief from removal.”). 
 235 Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008).  
 236 Although the statute provides that persons granted voluntary departure at the 
conclusion of removal proceedings may be granted up to 60 days to leave the country, 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) (2012), the immigration judge in Dada’s deportation case 
gave him 30 days. Dada, 554 U.S. at 6. 
 237 See Dada, 554 U.S. at 6-7. 
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time to adjudicate, but if Dada failed to comply with the time limit for 
voluntary departure he would become subject to significant statutory 
penalties, including ineligibility to seek adjustment of status for ten 
years.238 At the same time, if Dada complied with the departure order 
and left the country in a timely fashion, he would become ineligible to 
pursue his motion to reopen.239 
Rejecting the government’s view that Dada’s statutory right to 
reopen is constrained by the voluntary departure scheme,240 the Court 
held that noncitizens must be permitted to unilaterally withdraw from 
a voluntary departure order before the end of the authorized departure 
period in order to pursue a motion to reopen.241 In reaching this 
resolution, the majority emphasized the critical importance and long 
pedigree of motions to reopen in immigration cases.242 The Court 
described such motions as an “important safeguard,” the purpose of 
which “is to ensure a proper and lawful disposition.”243 Driving the 
Court’s statutory interpretation in Dada was its underlying concern 
that without a solution preserving the ability to reopen proceedings, 
noncitizens might be precluded from establishing their eligibility for 
adjustment of status or other statutory rights to remain in the United 
States lawfully.244 
Also important to the Court’s rationale were the practical limitations 
that noncitizens in Dada’s situation face. As the Court explained, the 
time periods permitted for voluntary departure will frequently expire 
before the agency renders a decision on the noncitizen’s motion to 
 
 238 See id. at 5. 
 239 See id.; see also 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(d) (2016). 
 240 See Dada, 554 U.S. at 15 (noting the government’s argument that “by requesting 
and obtaining permission to voluntarily depart, the alien knowingly surrenders the 
opportunity to seek reopening”); see also id. at 23-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that Dada “accepted the above described deal, but now . . . wants to back out”). 
 241 See id. at 21 (majority opinion). 
 242 See, e.g., id. at 12 (explaining that motions to reopen are a form of “procedural 
relief” used by federal judges in immigration cases at least as far back as 1916 and 
“later codified by federal statute”); id. at 12-13 (suggesting judicial intervention to 
reopen proceedings may not be warranted where noncitizens are not given a “full 
opportunity to testify and to present all witnesses and documentary evidence” 
(quoting and citing Wong Shong Been v. Proctor, 79 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1935))); 
id. at 18 (explaining the motion to reopen as an “important safeguard”); id. at 21 
(holding that an alien “must be permitted to withdraw . . . a voluntary departure 
request” to protect the right to pursue a motion to reopen). 
 243 Id. at 18; see also id. at 21 (“We hold that, to safeguard the right to pursue a 
motion to reopen for voluntary departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to 
withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request . . . .”). 
 244 See id. at 18, 22. 
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reopen, due to a massive agency backlog.245 Therefore, the possibility 
that a noncitizen’s motion to reopen would be adjudicated before the 
end of the voluntary departure period turns on a matter of “pure 
happenstance.”246 Moreover, the Court candidly hoped that 
“[a]llowing aliens to withdraw from their voluntary departure 
agreements,” would establish a “greater probability that their motions 
to reopen will be considered.”247 Finally, the Court found the statute 
and legislative history insufficiently clear to permit infringement of 
this vital procedural safeguard.248 Dada thus protected a noncitizen’s 
opportunity to present a defense to removal even after having accepted 
an order of voluntary departure. 
Two years later, Kucana v. Holder allowed the Court to further 
elaborate on the importance of allowing noncitizens adequate 
opportunity to present a defense to deportation. One of IIRIRA’s 
restrictions on judicial review provides that no federal court shall have 
jurisdiction to scrutinize discretionary agency actions.249 Kucana 
presented the question whether federal courts retain jurisdiction to 
review denials of noncitizens’ motions to reopen removal proceedings 
where the Attorney General — rather than Congress — has committed 
such determinations to the discretion of the agency.250 Justice 
Ginsburg’s majority opinion, joined by seven Justices, found that 
Congress intended to insulate from judicial review only agency 
decisions made discretionary by statute, in contrast to those so 
specified by administrative regulations.251 
Kucana applied for asylum in the late 1990s but was ordered 
removed when he failed to appear for his merits hearing.252 He 
remained in the country, however, and moved to reopen his removal 
proceedings in 2006, alleging that political conditions in his native 
 
 245 See id. at 17 (noting that many decisions are pending more than a year before 
the BIA). 
 246 Id. at 17. 
 247 Id. at 22; see also id. at 30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What does not appear from 
the Court’s opinion, however, is the source of the Court’s authority to increase that 
probability [that motions to reopen will be considered] in flat contradiction to the text 
of the statute.”). 
 248 See id. at 14-15 (majority opinion). 
 249 See Immigration and Nationalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) 
(2012). 
 250 See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 (2010). 
 251 See id. at 237. Justice Alito concurred in the Court’s judgment but would have 
resolved the case on narrower grounds, id. at 253 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 252 See id. at 239-40 (majority opinion). 
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Albania had materially worsened.253 The BIA declined to reopen. 
Departing from the conclusion of at least six other Courts of 
Appeals,254 the Seventh Circuit panel declined to take jurisdiction of 
Kucana’s case, holding that the INA bars judicial review of 
discretionary administrative decisions, whether so designated by 
statute or regulation.255 
The Court reversed, invoking the “longstanding exercise of judicial 
review of administrative rulings on reopening motions.”256 A motion 
to reopen, the Court emphasized, is an important “procedural device 
serving to ensure ‘that aliens [a]re getting a fair chance to have their 
claims heard.’”257 The Court found insufficient indication in the text 
or structure of the INA that Congress intended to eliminate judicial 
oversight of such a critical mechanism for equity — especially in cases 
like Kucana’s, where the underlying claim for relief (asylum) remains 
reviewable.258 As the Court explained, the plain language of IIRIRA 
expressly prohibits judicial review of the Attorney General’s 
discretionary judgments, but does not mention discretionary decisions 
delegated by regulation to immigration agency adjudicators.259 
The Court was also troubled that the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation would allow the executive agency “to shelter its own 
decisions from abuse-of-discretion appellate court review simply by 
issuing a regulation declaring those decisions ‘discretionary.’”260 This 
result would be an “extraordinary delegation” of authority, raising 
separation of powers concerns along with the possibility of 
 
 253 See id. at 240. 
 254 See id. at 240-41 n.7 (collecting cases). 
 255 Id. at 240. The U.S. Solicitor General at the time, Elena Kagan, declined to 
defend the Seventh Circuit’s decision and Professor Amanda Leiter of the Washington 
College of Law at American University was appointed to defend the lower federal 
court ruling. See id. at 241-42. 
 256 Id. at 237; see also id. (“We take account, as well, of the ‘presumption favoring 
interpretation of statutes [to] allow judicial review of administrative action.’” (citation 
omitted)); id. at 242 (observing that agency decisions about reopening deportation 
proceedings have been judicially scrutinized since “at least 1916” (quoting and citing 
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008))); id. at 251-52 (“Because the ‘presumption 
favoring interpretations of statutes [to] allow judicial review of administrative action’ 
is ‘well-settled,’ the Court assumes that ‘Congress legislates with knowledge of’ the 
presumption . . . .’” (citations omitted)). 
 257 Id. at 248; see also id. at 242, 250 (describing motions to reopen as “‘important 
safeguard[s]’ intended ‘to ensure a proper and lawful disposition’ of immigration 
proceedings” (quoting and citing Dada, 554 U.S. 1)). 
 258 See id. 
 259 See id. at 252. 
 260 Id. 
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unreviewable agency injustices affecting individual noncitizens facing 
removal.261 Kucana thus continued the Court’s efforts to ensure the 
continued availability of procedural vehicles for presenting defenses 
and seeking judicial review — mechanisms that took on greater 
urgency following Congress’s changes to the INA in the 1990s.262 
More recently, Mata v. Lynch required the Court to consider another 
challenge to judicial review of noncitizens’ attempt to reopen a 
removal order.263 Reyes Mata had entered the U.S. unlawfully. Fifteen 
years later, he was convicted in state criminal court of assault, put into 
immigration proceedings, and ordered removed. Mata’s attorney filed a 
notice of appeal with the BIA, but then failed to file a brief stating 
grounds for overturning the removal order. Not surprisingly, the BIA 
dismissed the appeal. Mata then obtained new counsel, who filed a 
motion to reopen his case with the BIA. The government opposed the 
appeal based on Mata’s failure to meet the 90-day statutory deadline 
for motions to reopen (he was at least 10 days late). 
Mata argued that the prior attorney’s ineffective assistance in failing 
to file a brief amounted to an exceptional circumstance excusing the 
lateness. Although the BIA agreed it had authority to equitably toll the 
filing period due to ineffective representation, it declined to do so 
because it discerned no prejudice to Mata’s case from the lawyer’s 
deficient assistance. Nor was this a situation, the BIA noted, “that 
would warrant reopening” through its sua sponte authority, because 
“the power to reopen on our own motion is not meant to be used as a 
general cure for filing defects.”264 
The Fifth Circuit declined to address the merits of Mata’s equitable 
tolling claim. Instead, it construed that claim as a request for the BIA 
to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis of its 
sua sponte authority. Because circuit precedent established that federal 
courts lack authority to review the Board’s exercise of sua sponte 
power, the Fifth Circuit deemed the relief sought by Mata to be 
“categorically unavailable.”265 
 
 261 See id. at 252-53; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 315, 316-17 (2000) (arguing that the judiciary employs nondelegation norms to 
limit executive rules in certain contexts in part to ensure that restrictions on 
individual rights are made by the institution with superior democratic legitimacy, 
namely Congress). 
 262 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 77 (observing 
that Kucana “builds on the Court’s line of decisions ensuring the judicial review of 
removal decisions in the face of increasingly stringent congressional restrictions”). 
 263 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2151 (2015). 
 264 Id. at 2153 (quoting the BIA’s decision). 
 265 Id. at 2155. Amicus appointed to defend the Fifth Circuit’s decision also argued 
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The Court reversed, finding the basis for the BIA’s denial of the 
motion to reopen to be irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue.266 The 
Court emphasized that “as we explained in Kucana, courts have 
reviewed those decisions for nearly a hundred years,” a tradition that 
Congress left intact in the INA even as it “curtailed other aspects of 
courts’ jurisdiction over BIA rulings.”267 Thus, Mata clarified that 
federal courts should review motions to reopen even where the agency 
has dismissed the motion as untimely. 
The Court also chastised the Fifth Circuit for its practice of 
recasting motions to reopen based on equitable tolling as a challenge 
to the Board’s sua sponte decision, and then declining to exercise 
jurisdiction. The Court observed that courts sometimes are permitted 
to recharacterize filings, but only to “identify[] a route to relief,” 
rather than to “render[] relief impossible.”268 The Court then 
described the lower court’s premise that motions to reopen are not 
subject to equitable tolling as merely “an assumption.”269 Although 
disclaiming any opinion about the merits of the equitable tolling 
claim, Justice Kagan observed that, aside from the Fifth Circuit, “all 
appellate courts to have addressed the matter have held that the Board 
may sometimes equitably toll the time limit for an alien’s motion to 
reopen.”270 To the extent that the Fifth Circuit disagrees with every 
other federal court about the merits of equitable tolling, the Court 
continued, it should not mask this division through legal gymnastics 
that clothe the issue in “jurisdictional garb.”271 Justice Kagan 
suggested that the Court would be interested in resolving this circuit 
split, and hinted in dicta that a noncitizen’s failure to comply with the 
statutory deadline to file a motion to reopen may well be subject to 
equitable tolling for reasons such as ineffective assistance of 
counsel.272 
A final second-look case to consider here is Nken v. Holder,273 which 
concerned another restrictive statutory provision not at issue in Dada, 
 
that the lower court’s approach was justified because “the INA forbids equitable 
tolling of the 90-day filing period in any case, no matter how exceptional the 
circumstances.” Id. 
 266 Only Justice Thomas dissented. Id. at 2150. 
 267 Id. at 2154. 
 268 Id. at 2156. 
 269 Id. at 2155. 
 270 Id. at 2155-56. 
 271 Id. at 2156. 
 272 See id.  
 273 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009). 
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Kucana, or Mata. That statute, enacted as part of Congress’s extensive 
amendments to the code in 1996, provides that “no court shall enjoin 
the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order” unless the 
noncitizen can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the 
order was “prohibited as a matter of law.”274 In a 7–2 decision 
authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court narrowly read the 
statutory term “enjoin” to encompass only a noncitizen’s request for 
an actual injunction, as opposed to a request for a judicial stay of the 
removal order.275 Accordingly, the Court held, lower courts should 
apply “the traditional standard” for stays, rather than the INA’s much 
more restrictive threshold.276 
Notably, the Court’s interpretation of the statute’s meaning rendered 
the subsection largely without purpose, because noncitizens seeking 
judicial review ordinarily will request stays of removal orders rather 
than injunctions. As the Chief Justice acknowledged, “the exact role of 
subsection (f)(2)” following the Court’s reading was “not easy to 
explain.”277 Nevertheless, the Court found it necessary to read the 
clause narrowly in order to preserve noncitizens’ opportunities for full 
consideration of their right to remain, in light of the system’s practical 
limitations on expeditious review by appellate courts.278 By insisting 
on the traditional stay factors for noncitizens seeking review, the 
Court maintained a preference for individual balancing and room for 
judicial discretion. Those structural preferences enable reviewing 
courts to directly consider equitable factors when determining 
whether to stay a challenged removal order. 
A normative concern lies beneath the procedural surface of these 
decisions.279 Especially when considered together, the second-look 
cases suggest that the Court is troubled by constrictions of 
 
 274 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(f) (2012). 
 275 Nken, 556 U.S. at 425-26. 
 276 See id. at 434. The traditional stay factors, the Court observed, are: “(1) whether 
the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether 
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the 
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 277 Id. at 431. 
 278 See id. at 421, 432-36.  
 279 See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1013, 1018 (2008) (observing that procedural rules often “draw not only upon 
substantive assumptions about the probability of particular facts but also normative 
judgments about where we want the risk of error in cases to fall”). 
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noncitizens’ opportunity to present a defense against deportation, even 
after a final order of removal. Some of the cases also evince a concern 
with the particular harm caused by inadequate assistance of counsel in 
the removal context. With a robust right to reopen proceedings, the 
risk that a person will be erroneously deported decreases. On the other 
hand, a strong opportunity to reopen increases the risk that a person 
will have the opportunity to remain in the United States in the face of 
a removal order. Thus, it is notable that the Court’s second-look cases 
take account of the realities of the deportation system and preserve 
structural opportunities to avoid removal where relief may be 
available, even in the face of increasing statutory stringency and at 
some presumptive cost to efficiency and administrative ease for the 
agency and reviewing courts.280 
E. Prolonged Detention 
A particularly salient feature of the modern deportation system 
involves immigration officials’ sweeping authority to detain 
noncitizens pursuant to both discretionary and mandatory rules.281 
The Court issued three decisions concerning detention provisions 
between 2001 and 2005. Despite the proliferation of immigration 
detention and widespread litigation on this issue in lower federal 
courts, however, the Court declined to review further challenges to 
immigration detention for over a decade. Although the Court’s two 
primary decisions in this trio — Zadvydas v. Davis and Demore v. Kim 
— created some tension in the law, a critical concurring opinion by 
Justice Kennedy in Demore has proven over time to be highly 
influential to lower courts tasked with reconciling the two holdings, to 
the benefit of noncitizens detained while facing removal. This term the 
Court will finally weigh in on these issues again, in Jennings v. 
Rodriguez,282 a case that should bring much needed clarity to the 
procedural rights held by detained noncitizens in ongoing removal 
proceedings. If the Court upholds the Ninth Circuit’s decision,283 
 
 280 Cf. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the 
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 730 (1975) (“[I]t seems impossible to conceive of a manner of 
allocating risks of uncertainty without considering substantive preferences.”); 
Martinez, supra note 279, at 1019 (“We presume innocence in criminal trials not 
because we think most defendants are in fact innocent, but because of concerns about 
limiting government power and a preference for avoiding erroneous convictions even 
at the cost of erroneous acquittals.”). 
 281 See supra Part I. 
 282 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (granting petition for certiorari). 
 283 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. 
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many more noncitizens will gain the opportunity to secure release 
from detention, significantly facilitating their ability to raise legal and 
equitable defenses to deportation. 
The discussion begins with Zadvydas v. Davis,284 which was decided 
during the same term as St. Cyr.285 Zadvydas concerned the 
immigration agency’s prolonged detention of former LPRs who had 
been ordered removed. The INA mandates detention for 90 days after 
any deportation order in order to effectuate the noncitizen’s physical 
removal from the United States.286 The statute also provides authority 
to continue detention of noncitizens not removed within the 90-day 
period on a discretionary basis.287 The executive branch interpreted 
this provision to allow indefinite detention of noncitizens with final 
orders who could not be removed, for example where no other 
country was willing to take them.288 As a result, some noncitizens 
become “unremovables,” confined for years, with no end in sight.289 
Zadvydas concerned two such would-be lifers, former-LPRs with 
criminal histories.290 
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court avoided 
the due process problems raised by indefinite detention of the 
unremovables by construing the statute to permit continued post-
order detention beyond the 90-day period only so long as removal was 
“reasonably foreseeable.” The Court found that post-order detention 
for six months would not raise constitutional concerns, but held that 
noncitizens become eligible for release after such period if they can 
show that there is “no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future.”291 
 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016). 
 284 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 285 See supra Part II.B. 
 286 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2012). 
 287 Id. § 1231(a)(6).  
 288 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.  
 289 See, e.g., Lise Olsen, Case Tests the Rights of Immigrants Held in U.S. Jails, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 24, 1999), http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0524/ 
p2s2.html. 
 290 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-86 (discussing facts of the two plaintiffs in 
Zadvydas who could not be removed, one of whom was stateless and the other of 
whom was a citizen of a country lacking a repatriation treaty with the United States, 
and whom the government had been detaining for years). 
 291 Id. at 701. The Court rejected the executive’s assertion that continued detention 
was necessary to ensure the noncitizens did not endanger the community or fail to 
appear at future removal proceedings. Id. at 690-91. The Court arrived at the six-
month presumptive limit for the reasonableness of post-deportation-order detention 
by looking to earlier provisions of the INA, which permitted (but did not require) 
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Whether Zadvydas should be considered a victory for liberty 
interests depends upon one’s perspective. Viewed through the lens of 
criminal or civil detention generally, the Court’s willingness to 
insulate the government from judicial scrutiny of the legality of 
detention for at least six months would seem shocking.292 Moreover, 
even after that point, a rule placing the burden on the detainee to 
show that removal is not reasonably foreseeable is out of step with 
mainstream norms governing confinement. Normally, it is the 
responsibility of the government to justify continuing detention.293 
Thus, as others have observed, Zadvydas permits at least half a year of 
incarceration without requiring the government to make any 
individualized showing of dangerousness or flight risk, a rule that flies 
in the face of long-established due process law protecting fundamental 
liberty interests.294 
In the context of the history of immigration law in the United States, 
however, Zadvydas’s interpretation of the statute had a progressive 
cast. The Court stepped away from a long line of decisions granting 
the government virtually limitless authority to detain noncitizens who 
have been determined to have no legal claim to enter or remain in the 
United States. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, for example, permitted the 
government to indefinitely detain the immigrating spouse of a U.S. 
citizen, who by that time had been held for three years at Ellis 
 
post-deportation-order detention for up to 6 months. See id. at 697-98 (citing 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 242(c), 66 Stat. 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c), 
(d) (1982 ed.)). The Court also found detention limits in similar contexts to be 
persuasive. See id. at 700-01 (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) 
(plurality opinion) (extending right to jury for cases with sentences of six months or 
greater), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (recognizing that 
a probable cause hearing provided within 48 hours of arrest is presumed reasonable)).  
 292 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (holding that a Louisiana 
statute which permitted indefinite detention of mentally ill individual until detainee 
could prove that he is no longer dangerous was an unconstitutional violation of due 
process); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is 
the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception.”). 
 293 See generally Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1995) (“The scope of the 
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. . . . It is the State’s 
burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable 
suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an 
investigative seizure.”). 
 294 See Anello, supra note 24, at 376-83; Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Detention: 
No Turning Back?, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 621 (2014); Cesar Garcia Hernandez, Invisible 
Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration Detention, 57 HOWARD L.J. 869, 878-79, 881-
82 (2014) [hereinafter Invisible Spaces]. 
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Island.295 The Court proclaimed: “Whatever the procedure authorized 
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”296 A few years later, Shaughnessy v. Mezei characterized 
the government’s indefinite detention of a returning noncitizen 
deemed inadmissible on undisclosed national security grounds as 
“temporary harborage” and “an act of legislative grace.”297 Therefore, 
the Court held, such detention was not susceptible to judicial review, 
no matter how long the duration, and regardless of the fact that Mezei 
had lived in the United States lawfully for many years before being 
excluded upon his return from a trip abroad. In simple terms, the 
majority did not think Mezei had any statutory or constitutional 
rights.298 
Justice Scalia dissented in Zadvydas, arguing that Knauff and Mezei 
required the Court to reject the unremovables’ challenge to their 
detention. Justice Scalia characterized the challenge in Zadvydas as “a 
claimed right of release into this country by an individual who 
concededly has no legal right to be here.”299 Noting that Mezei “upheld 
potentially indefinite detention of such an inadmissible alien whom 
the Government was unable to return anywhere else,” Scalia found 
nothing to distinguish “an alien under a valid and final order of 
removal — which has totally extinguished whatever right to presence 
in this country he possessed.”300 In short, Justice Scalia would have 
found former-LPRs like those in Zadvydas to possess no constitutional 
right to challenge their continued detention. In a separate dissenting 
opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the unremovables’ 
“substantial” right to be free of arbitrary and capricious detention, but 
found that existing administrative practices satisfied procedural due 
process.301 
Following Zadvydas, immigration authorities applied the Court’s 
six-month rule to all noncitizens ordered deported after being 
apprehended inside the United States, whether or not they had ever 
been lawfully present.302 Federal authorities continued, however, to 
subject noncitizens attempting to enter the United States to lengthy 
detention, including those for whom removal was not reasonably 
 
 295 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
 296 Id. 
 297 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953). 
 298 See id. at 215. 
 299 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 703 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 300 Id. at 703-04. 
 301 See id. at 706, 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 302 See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b) (2016). 
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foreseeable. The primary example of this involved some of the Mariel 
Cubans, who, after being apprehended by the Coast Guard, had been 
paroled into the country pending formal admission decisions. Some 
went on to commit crimes, with the result that their parole was 
revoked and they were found inadmissible.303 Challenges to the 
indefinite detention of these and similarly situated noncitizens 
eventually reached the Supreme Court in Clark v. Martinez.304 This 
time Justice Scalia authored the majority decision, which held that the 
Court’s construction in Zadvydas of the post-removal-order-detention 
provision must be applied consistently in all situations, including 
those involving noncitizens apprehended at entry.305 
Thus, with respect to the detention of noncitizens who have been 
ordered deported or excluded but cannot be removed, the Court has 
construed the statute to impose a fixed outer limit on immigration 
detention. This construction followed from the long-held 
understanding that freedom from physical detention “lies at the heart 
of the liberty” interest protected by constitutional due process.306 
In the 2003 decision Demore v. Kim,307 however, the Court seemed 
to backtrack from this recognition in Zadvydas. In Demore, a 5–4 
majority rejected a due process challenge to the INA’s mandatory 
detention rule brought by an LPR detained during removal 
proceedings for six months without a bond hearing. The holding came 
as something of a surprise, because every circuit court of appeals to 
consider a challenge to the mandatory detention provisions after 
Zadvydas had found a due process violation.308 
The case sharply divided the Justices.309 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote for the Court on the due process issue, but the critical fifth vote 
 
 303 See Laurie Joyce, INS Detention Practices Post-Zadvydas v. Davis, 79 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 809 (2002). 
 304 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005). 
 305 See id. at 378 (“As the Court in Zadvydas recognized, the statute can be 
construed ‘literally’ to authorize indefinite detention, or (as the Court ultimately held) 
it can be read to ‘suggest [less than] unlimited discretion’ to detain. It cannot, 
however, be interpreted to do both at the same time.”); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 
710-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 6-month gloss given the post-removal 
detention statute by the majority in Zadvydas in part because the same provision also 
governs the detention of arriving aliens excluded at the border). 
 306 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Traum, supra note 126, at 521-22. 
 307 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 308 See Anello, supra note 24, at 383 n.117 (citing pre-Demore decisions from the 
3rd, 4th, 9th, and 10th Circuit Courts of Appeal finding mandatory detention to 
violate due process). 
 309 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Part I, which held that the 
Court had jurisdiction to review challenges to the mandatory detention provision. 
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in support of his ruling on that aspect of the case was provided by 
Justice Kennedy, who also wrote a separate concurrence. 
The Chief Justice distinguished Zadvydas in two important respects. 
First, Zadvydas concerned noncitizens “for whom removal was ‘no 
longer practically attainable.’”310 In that situation, continued detention 
no longer furthered the purpose underlying confinement. In contrast, 
detention during removal proceedings increases the possibility that 
noncitizens will be successfully removed if ordered deported.311 Even 
more critical for the underlying due process analysis was the Court’s 
assessment that detention during removal proceedings is of much 
shorter duration than the “potentially permanent” period rejected in 
Zadvydas.312 In reaching this assessment, the Court noted government-
provided data indicating that in most cases removal proceedings were 
completed within an average of 47 days, or, in the event of an appeal, 
four months.313 More generally, Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the 
breadth of Congress’s power over immigration rules and noted that 
detention has long been recognized as “a constitutionally valid aspect 
of the deportation process.”314 The Chief Justice also expounded on 
the dangers posed by “criminal aliens” and Congress’s belief that the 
INS was unable to remove them without mandatory detention.315 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion acknowledged the important 
due process concerns raised by detention and emphasized that the 
Court’s ruling was predicated on the understandings that (1) 
noncitizens had the right to challenge the government’s assertion that 
they fell into a mandatory detention category, and (2) detention 
during removal proceedings was generally of a brief duration.316 
Justice Kennedy went on to indicate his view that a noncitizen “could 
 
Demore, 538 U.S. at 512, 516-17. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Part II, 
which found no due process violation. Id. at 512, 517-31. Justice Kennedy joined the 
Chief Justice’s opinion in full, but also wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 531 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 310 Id. at 527 (majority opinion). 
 311 See id. at 527-28. 
 312 See id. at 528-29. 
 313 See id. at 529 (“In the remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the 
decision of the Immigration Judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes 
an average of four months with a median time that is slightly shorter.”). 
 314 Id. at 521-23 (citing, inter alia, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) and 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)). 
 315 See id. at 518-21 (describing the INS’s “wholesale failure . . . to deal with 
increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens” and “near-total inability to remove 
deportable criminal aliens”). 
 316 See id. at 531-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight 
and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or 
unjustified.”317 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices 
Stevens and Ginsburg, offered a full-throated account of the liberty 
interests at stake, and excoriated the majority for ignoring decades of 
case law cutting the other way, including Zadvydas.318 Justice Breyer 
dissented separately.319 
A number of commentators have suggested that the differing 
outcomes (and tenors) of Zadvydas and Demore reflect the influence of 
the intervening September 11, 2001 terrorist attack and its security-
focused political aftermath.320 And in fact, over the long run, Demore 
has proven a weaker precedent for executive detention authority than 
critics originally feared. Lower federal courts have increasingly 
distinguished Demore as limited to a particular set of facts that no 
longer mark pre-removal detention. In particular, in rejecting the 
challenge to the mandatory detention statute both Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence had 
emphasized the relatively short duration of removal proceedings.321 In 
 
 317 Id. at 532; see also id. at 532-33 (“Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the 
INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary 
then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect 
against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.”). 
 318 See id. at 543, 560-61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“While there are differences 
between detention pending removal proceedings (this case) and detention after entry 
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stronger claim.”). 
 319 Id. at 576 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 320 See Anello, supra note 24, at 376; Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial 
Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 365 (David A. Martin & 
Peter H. Shuck eds., 2005); Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of 
Aliens Three Years After September 11: A New New World?, 38 UC DAVIS L. REV. 815, 
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 321 It has recently come to light that the Court’s understanding in Demore of typical 
detention times was inaccurate, in reliance on erroneous representations by the 
Department of Justice in that litigation. See Letter from Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting 
Solicitor Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, Clerk, U.S. Supreme 
Court (Aug. 26, 2016), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Demore.pdf. See 
infra text accompanying notes 328-30. 
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contrast, immigration proceedings now average over 500 days in 
general, and over 400 days for detained respondents.322 As a result, 
lower federal courts have increasingly applied the due process norms 
expounded in Zadvydas to situations involving mandatory detention 
during removal proceedings, requiring individualized bond hearings 
when detention becomes unreasonably long. 
In Lora v. Shanaham, for example, the Second Circuit relied on 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Demore and the presumptive 
constitutional limit established by the majority in Zadvydas to hold 
that noncitizens detained during removal be afforded an individual 
bond hearing within six months.323 The court held “there must be 
some procedural safeguard in place for immigrants detained for 
months without a hearing.”324 Every other circuit to squarely consider 
the issue has reached a similar conclusion, although courts have 
differed with respect to whether to impose the presumptive six-month 
limit.325 Thus, the Court’s rulings in Zadvydas, Demore, and Clark 
exerted a somewhat libertarian influence on lower courts adjudicating 
due process challenges to immigration detention. Together, the cases 
established reasonableness — sometimes defined as a presumptive six-
month limit — as a benchmark for permissible detention before the 
 
 322 See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
persons facing detention during proceedings “spend, on average, 404 days in 
immigration detention”); Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC 
IMMIGR. (Sept. 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_ 
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 323 See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 613-615 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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 325 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1068, 1090 (finding that “the Court’s holding in 
Demore turned on the brevity of mandatory detention” and requiring that bond 
hearings be provided at six-month intervals); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 
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Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ourts must examine the facts of 
each case, to determine whether there has been unreasonable delay in concluding 
removal proceedings.”); Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455, 472, 475 
(D. Mass. 2010) (noting the constitutional limits on detention during the removal 
process articulated by Justice Kennedy and holding that a 22-month detention 
violated due process). 
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government must provide an individualized bond hearing or release 
the noncitizen. 
Notably, this term the Court will once again weigh in on a challenge 
to immigration detention. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court will have 
an opportunity to revisit Demore. In that litigation the Ninth Circuit 
upheld a federal injunction requiring DHS to provide bond hearings to 
noncitizens in removal proceedings when their detention reaches six 
months, with release if determined to not be a flight or public safety 
risk.326 The injunction implicates several of the statutory mandatory 
detention categories, including noncitizens seeking admission to the 
United States and noncitizens with criminal convictions (the same 
category at issue in Demore).327 In the fashion of Zadvydas, the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling was statutory, employing the interpretive canon of 
constitutional avoidance to read a right to periodic review of the 
government’s justification for continued detention into the provisions. 
There is some basis to suspect that the Court will uphold most or all 
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, or will find an alternative means of 
exerting due-process influenced limitations on the detention 
provisions. First, as already mentioned, the lower federal courts have 
resoundingly endeavored to distinguish Demore in light of the 
significantly increased length of detention since that decision was 
issued. What is more, it has recently come to light that the 
Department of Justice actually misled the Court in Demore regarding 
the duration of typical detention times.328 In particular, rather than the 
four-months figure for detention where an appeal is taken that was 
provided to the Court, it turns out the average length of detention at 
that time was in fact 382 days, with a median of 272 days.329 As 
discussed above, this government-generated data regarding the alleged 
brevity of detention during removal proceedings appeared to have 
persuaded Justice Kennedy to join the Court’s holding and provide the 
critical concurrence in Demore. Thus, although the DOJ’s erroneous 
representations may have been inadvertent, the recent retraction 
further undermines the rationale of that decision and its value as 
precedent.330 
 
 326 See Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1078-85. 
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Furthermore, as I have shown in this article, Demore is something of 
an outlier in the Court’s deportation jurisprudence over the last fifteen 
years, which across the board has aimed to increase noncitizen’s 
opportunities to present legal and equitable defenses to removal. 
Allowing noncitizens who do not pose a flight risk or danger to secure 
release after six months (or at the point when detention becomes 
unreasonable, in light of guidelines the Court may issue in Rodriguez) 
will significantly further such goals. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its 
decision, “many detainees choose to give up meritorious claims and 
voluntarily leave the country instead of enduring years of immigration 
detention awaiting a judicial finding of their lawful status.”331 For all 
these reasons, the Court may well approach Rodriguez with one eye on 
the case’s equity-enhancing consequences and the other on the 
government hoodwink that helped produced the result in Demore in 
the first place. 
It bears noting, however, that even if the outcome of Rodriguez is 
positive for noncitizens, neither it nor the Court’s earlier detention 
cases concern the conditions or the frequency of immigration 
detention. A number of commentators have highlighted the significant 
hardships for noncitizens and their families that follow from 
immigration detention.332 Noncitizens are overwhelmingly held in 
highly restrictive conditions that differ little from those endured by 
convicted felons; in fact, immigration detainees are often held 
alongside criminal inmates in prisons.333 Solitary confinement, 
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restricted visitation, abuse, and inadequate medical care are 
increasingly well-documented.334 A recent report on eleven 
immigrant-only contract detention sites found striking medical 
neglect, including “critical delays in care” for detainees with “cancer, 
AIDS, mental illness, and liver and heart disease,” failures to properly 
diagnose patients with “obvious and painful symptoms,” and 
widespread use of overworked, underqualified medical workers.335 
Furthermore, many detained noncitizens face substantial practical 
obstacles to challenging either their removal or their detention, 
including the lack of any right (or even access) to counsel, and 
disconnection from family and other support networks.336 
Even so, the modern Court’s detention cases reflect a break with 
longstanding precedent in establishing an outer limit on the time that 
the Executive can detain noncitizens without an individualized 
hearing regarding the appropriateness of continued confinement. The 
Court’s recent jurisprudence thus has yielded (and may further 
strengthen, in this term’s Rodriguez decision) an important safeguard 
against unreasonably long detentions as a consequence of immigration 
violations. These limits are significant in facilitating the ability of 
many noncitizens to raise (and win) equitable and legal defenses to 
removal.337 
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
In recent years, the Court has devoted a significant portion of its 
shrinking docket to adjudicating disputes that bear on the possibility 
of normatively unjust deportations.338 As this Article has 
demonstrated, the Court’s deportation jurisprudence recognizes, and 
attempts to structure, the critical role that enforcement discretion 
plays in the modern deportation system. Across a diverse set of legal 
issues, the cases evince a deep concern with the sweep of the statute, 
especially with respect to minor offenses leading to removal, 
detention, or to the inability to access discretionary relief. Unpacking 
all of the implications and drawbacks of the Court’s approach presents 
many considerations that I cannot fully address in this article. Here 
my primary aim has been to bring some coherence to the Court’s 
deportation jurisprudence as a whole, which until now has been 
examined in piecemeal fashion. However, a few of the most salient 
implications and limitations are readily apparent, and a logical starting 
point involves holistically reviewing the practical effects of the Court’s 
key rulings on the deportation process, as discussed in Part II. 
First, Arizona consolidates immigration enforcement power in 
federal officials, insulating discretionary non-enforcement priorities 
and choices from uninvited interference by state or local police. 
Arizona leaves no doubt that federal immigration officials may decline 
to enforce the law in some situations, even when dealing with persons 
who, as a matter of formal code law, are removable. Eventually, the 
Court may decide whether immigration officials may implement 
equity-based non-enforcement decisions on a more generalized 
basis.339 
Of course, a system that primarily depends on enforcement 
discretion to achieve justice channels far-reaching power and 
responsibility to a particular set of institutional actors — namely, 
agency policy-makers and their front-line enforcement officers and 
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prosecutors. Immigration-enforcers, however, may not always be best 
suited to determine with accuracy which cases warrant the exercise of 
equitable discretion.340 Worse yet, consolidating power in the 
executive could result in a constriction of equitable decisionmaking. 
The risks that executive officials might fall short in injecting justice 
into the immigration system thus may have played a key part in the 
modern Court’s many process-centered decisions, the overarching 
thrust of which aim to protect noncitizens’ liberty interests. 
To recap, Padilla ensures that a noncitizen who faces criminal 
charges will be aware of the immigration consequences that attach to 
various dispositions of the case, and encourages equity-based 
bargaining to avoid normatively unjustified deportations. The 
categorical approach and anti-retroactivity procedural cases work in 
conjunction with Padilla to facilitate strategic plea-bargaining and to 
keep open post-conviction possibilities for equitable relief. Judulang 
also suggests a restraint on immigration charging decisions that would 
arbitrarily preclude the possibility of equitable relief, and, more 
broadly, emphasizes the need to link enforcement actions to a 
normative evaluation of a noncitizen’s fitness to remain in the United 
States. The second-look cases safeguard the ability of noncitizens to 
reopen removal cases, particularly when there is new evidence bearing 
on a defense to deportation or when the removal order stems from 
deficient attorney conduct. Finally, the detention cases impose outer 
limits on government authority to confine noncitizens — limits that 
depart sharply from more deferential principles previously embraced 
by a majority of the Court.341 
Viewed holistically, the cases suggest that the modern Court 
believes that factors such as a noncitizen’s presence in, connections 
with, and contributions to the United States, along with other 
mitigating factors (such as youth or the passage of time), should be 
balanced against the gravity of the immigration or criminal violation 
in order to evaluate whether deportation is warranted in individual 
cases. Thus, across the board, the Court’s recent deportation 
jurisprudence appears to be guided by some kind of a proportionality 
principle, even though it has never directly articulated that principle, 
and may never do so. Some of the decisions directly concern the ratio 
between the underlying offense and the gravity of the sanction, while 
 
 340 See, e.g., Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 31, at 46-54 
(explaining why front-line immigration agents have difficulty consistently exercising 
equitable discretion). 
 341 See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 227-28 
(1953). 
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others aim to facilitate equitable claims, many of which are statute-
based. The remainder of this Part elaborates on a few of the 
implications and drawbacks of the Court’s approach to the 
implementation of equity concerns in the deportation system. 
A. Crime and Status 
As both a legal and practical matter, modern immigration 
enforcement against noncitizens is closely tied to criminal history. 
Many commentators have discussed the executive branch’s 
enthusiastic implementation of the criminal detention and removal 
provisions enacted by Congress in the 1990s.342 In Ingrid Eagly’s 
words, “federal immigration enforcement has become a criminal 
removal system.”343 Indeed, the theme of executive decisionmaking in 
this area has been that criminal history, no matter how minor, is 
treated as an almost irrefutable signifier of undesirability. 
The present-day Court, however, has taken a different tack. Since 
the 2001 ruling in St. Cyr, the Court has repeatedly scrutinized the 
immigration system’s tight linkage of criminal behavior and 
deportation. The Court’s decisions demonstrate that it believes 
consideration of the normative justifiability of deportation to be 
appropriate even where the noncitizen has a criminal history. Its 
categorical approach and related criminal deportation rulings, for 
example, dilute the otherwise little-restrained power of immigration 
officials to remove noncitizens on the basis of minor criminal 
convictions. These decisions indicate that the Court takes seriously 
the principle that severe penalties imposed on the basis of criminal 
convictions should be predicated on a more individualized 
consideration of equities.344 On the other hand, this does not mean 
that the Court’s proportionality concerns only inure to the benefit of 
noncitizens with criminal history. In Torres, for example, a majority of 
 
 342 See, e.g., Das, supra note 132, at 1725 (“[E]nforcement of all of these criminal 
grounds is rapidly expanding. The temptation for immigration officials to continue to 
erode categorical analysis in order to give more life to various removal provisions is 
great.”); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the 
Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 651-52 (2004) 
(“[W]e live in a time of extreme ‘vigor, efficiency, and strictness’ as to deportation of 
non-citizens convicted of crimes, due to nearly two decades of sustained attention to 
this issue.” (footnote omitted)); Koh, supra note 131, at 307.  
 343 Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens, supra note 80, at 1128.  
 344 Cf. Bowers, Baselines, supra note 17, at 1089 (arguing that the Court’s recent 
criminal plea-bargaining cases “may even have subtly laid the foundation for a weak 
version of what I consider to be the proper baseline — a normative baseline grounded in 
an entitlement to proportional punishment” (emphasis in original)). 
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Justices was willing to depart slightly from the Court’s general 
insistence on a strict categorical approach to analyzing immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions, in order to avoid a statutory 
interpretation that it perceived would allow very serious offenders to 
more easily avoid deportation.345 The Court’s primary concern appears 
to be with the extreme harshness of the statutory provisions enacted in 
the 1990s, and in particular with the possibility of balancing in cases 
involving persons with relatively minor convictions. 
Additionally, a handful of the Court’s decisions address the weak 
procedural protections afforded to noncitizens in immigration 
proceedings, supplementing its efforts to ensure that disproportionate 
consequences do not accompany minor convictions. In these ways, the 
Court has emerged as the sole federal branch willing to protect 
deportable noncitizens with criminal history. 
The Court’s deportation holdings also benefit noncitizens present in 
the United States without authorization or any formal path to lawful 
status. Arizona provides the most direct example, since Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion explicitly acknowledged that the ruling 
will allow federal immigration officials to forgo removal proceedings 
against undocumented noncitizens.346 Eleven million undocumented 
persons live in the United States, and the vast majority of those 
individuals have been here for over a decade.347 As the Court 
recognized in Arizona, many of these persons will have formed 
families and other community bonds that make deportation 
“inappropriate.”348 
Padilla’s Sixth Amendment rule likewise works to the benefit of 
undocumented noncitizens. It is well-accepted that the Constitution’s 
criminal trial procedural protections are not contingent upon 
immigration status.349 Severe immigration penalties such as detention, 
 
 345 See supra text accompanying notes 204–11; see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 
U.S. 29, 40 (2009). 
 346 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“Returning an 
alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed 
a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.”).  
 347 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable 
for Half a Decade, PEW RES. CTR. (July 22, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/07/22/unauthorized-immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade/.  
 348 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2499; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 202 (1982) (striking down as unconstitutional a Texas statute denying public 
education to undocumented children). 
 349 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); Daniel A. 
Horwitz, Actually, Padilla Does Apply to Undocumented Defendants, 19 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 1, 30 (2016). But see César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Padilla v. Kentucky’s 
  
2017] Judging Immigration Equity 1097 
ineligibility for discretionary relief, truncated removal procedures, and 
lengthy or permanent bars on lawful return, automatically attach to 
convictions whether or not a defendant is already deportable for 
unlawful entry or unlawful presence.350 Therefore, to provide 
constitutionally adequate assistance, defense attorneys must advise 
their undocumented clients about such consequences. Moreover, 
Padilla’s equitable function of promoting plea-negotiation strategies 
that take deportation into account will carry over to cases involving 
unlawfully present noncitizens.351 
The results of the categorical approach similarly do not turn on the 
immigration status of the noncitizen. Categorical analysis works to 
keep certain convictions from being deemed particular removal 
offense categories, for example the aggravated felony categories. 
Aggravated felonies disqualify undocumented noncitizens from 
cancellation of removal or asylum.352 Aggravated felonies can also 
result in expedited “administrative removal” proceedings for 
undocumented noncitizens, with even fewer procedural rights than 
are provided by regular immigration courts.353 Finally, and most 
importantly, aggravated felonies result in a permanent bar to lawful 
return. Thus, by limiting the convictions that can be deemed 
aggravated felonies, the application of the categorical approach clearly 
can benefit the undocumented even if they remain deportable solely 
on the basis of unlawful status. In like fashion, the second-look and 
detention cases impact noncitizens facing removal who lack lawful 
immigration status.354 
 
Inapplicability to Undocumented and Non-Immigrant Visitors, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 47, 48 
(2012) (arguing that Padilla’s Sixth Amendment rule does not apply to criminal 
defendants who are not LPRs). 
 350 See Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis, supra note 31, at 1809-10; Michael J. Wishnie, 
Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 415, 445 
(2012). 
 351 See text accompanying supra notes 132–39, and infra note 349. 
 352 See Immigration and Nationalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) 
(2012) (aggravated felony is “particularly serious crime” precluding asylum); id. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(C) (aggravated felony precludes cancellation of removal for non-LPRs). 
Convictions classified as crimes involving moral turpitude can also preclude non-LPR 
cancellation of removal in some circumstances. See Cortez, 25 I.&N. Dec. 301, 311 
(B.I.A. 2010) (holding that a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude bars 
undocumented noncitizens from seeking cancellation of removal if the offense carries 
a potential sentence of one year or more). 
 353 See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1)–(2); Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 
18, at 673; Wadhia, supra note 231, at 2-3. 
 354 See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (holding that a statutory 
provision cannot be given different meaning depending on the immigration status of 
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We should not miss the significance of this expansive conception of 
which persons have some claim to continued presence that the Court 
believes is appropriately evaluated prior to the imposition of 
banishment. In a seminal article on the modern convergence of 
criminal law and immigration enforcement, Juliet Stumpf observed 
that “at bottom, both criminal law and immigration law embody 
choices about who should be members of society: individuals whose 
characteristics or actions make them worthy of inclusion in the 
national community.”355 While criminal law strips elements of 
membership from serious offenders, immigration law acts as a fence 
around membership, admitting only those noncitizens who can clearly 
establish their right to pass through the gate.356 Many millions of 
undocumented noncitizens in the United States lack any path to 
lawful status, perpetually fenced out from full inclusion. But the 
Court’s conception of potential claims to membership, or at least some 
of its aspects, is broader and more inclusive than formal code law, 
which presumes non-membership.357 In this sense, the Court’s 
understanding of immigration law and membership appears to overlap 
with a theory of inclusion that Hiroshi Motomura has described as 
“immigration as affiliation.”358 Under this view, immigration law 
should acknowledge and account for immigrants’ family ties and 
community contributions in this country.359 Because current code law 
provides insufficient mechanisms for adjudicative consideration of 
 
the person being detained). 
 355 Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 397 (2006). 
 356 Id. at 399-400; see Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, & the Difference that 
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (1994); Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing 
Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 157-58 (1999). 
 357 The Court’s conception of undocumented children as deserving at least some of 
the protections afforded by U.S. society membership, despite their deportability, was 
also present in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 358 MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 110-11. 
 359 This way of understanding the Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence also 
helps explain why it is less solicitous with respect to due process challenges to visa 
admission denials, which typically involve noncitizens yet to build significant equities 
in the United States. See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 135 (2015); see also Linda 
Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 389 (2007) (articulating “ethical territoriality,” the idea that physical 
presence within the United States gives rise to rights and recognition); Geoffrey 
Hereen, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the 
United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367 (2013) (discussing the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders with respect to rights); Daniel I. Morales, Immigration 
Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 49 (2013) (same). 
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affiliation circumstances, the Court has endorsed the weighing of such 
factors through upstream discretionary enforcement decisions and 
criminal court negotiations. It has also reinforced anti-retroactivity 
norms and tools such as the categorical approach, which soften some 
of the harshest aspects of the criminal removal provisions. 
To be sure, with respect to unauthorized noncitizens the Court’s 
solicitude in this regard extends no further than endorsement of 
discretionary permission to remain where the equities are strong 
enough; the immigration cases do not create new paths to status or 
citizenship. Nevertheless, the freedom to stay inside the United States, 
still unified with family and community, is arguably the most 
fundamental aspect of membership, even if it falls far short of 
conferring the status necessary for equal membership. Furthermore, 
deportable noncitizens who manage to remain within the United 
States as a result of individual or macro enforcement choices are much 
more likely to benefit from future developments in law or policy than 
those who already have been deported.360 
Seen in this light, the Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence 
resonates with the representation-reinforcing theory championed by 
John Hart Ely.361 As Professor Ely argued, the judiciary has a special 
responsibility to protect marginalized and politically voiceless 
groups.362 In St. Cyr, the Court explicitly referenced the “political 
pressures” that may lead the legislature to target “unpopular groups or 
individuals.”363 The Court noted that noncitizens, lacking the right to 
vote, “are particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation.”364 The 
proportionality principle at work in St. Cyr and other discretion-
preserving deportation cases can thus been seen as implementing 
“resilient strains of constitutional theory most famously expressed in 
‘footnote four’ of United States v. Carolene Products Co.”365 The political 
branches, the Court seems to believe, have paid insufficient attention 
 
 360 See MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 86 (“The idea of Americans in waiting is an 
expectation, held by both a newcomer and those already here, that the newcomer will 
belong someday.”). 
 361 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
181-83 (1980). 
 362 See id. 
 363 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 (2001) (quoting and citing Landgraf v. USI 
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994)). 
 364 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 n.39 (quoting and citing Stephen Legomsky, Fear and 
Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
1615 (2000)). 
 365 See Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and 
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (2002). 
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to the equitable claims of noncitizens who have convictions, or who 
lack resident status, before imposing life-altering immigration 
sanctions. The Court’s recent deportation jurisprudence appears 
calibrated, within the judiciary’s institutional constraints, to address 
that failure. 
B. Categorical (Non-)Enforcement Discretion? 
This understanding of the Court’s growing solicitude for the 
equitable rights of unauthorized noncitizens also has implications for 
larger-scale discretionary policies designed to limit the removal of 
noncitizens with particularly sympathetic equities, such as those at 
issue in United States v. Texas.366 While unique features of the Obama 
administration’s efforts to extend deferred action to certain childhood 
arrivals and parents of U.S. citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents 
complicate evaluation of their legality, the wide scholarly consensus 
was that they comprised permissible exercises of enforcement 
discretion.367 For present purposes, we may sidestep a full engagement 
 
 366 Announced late in 2014, the deferred action programs were soon halted by a 
federal lawsuit brought by 26 states or state officials. See David Montgomery & Julia 
Preston, 17 States Suing on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014); Alicia Parlapiano, 
What Is President Obama’s Immigration Plan?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014). The district 
court preliminarily enjoined the rollout of the programs on the grounds that they 
amounted to a formal rule that should have been promulgated through notice and 
comment procedures. See Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 604, 677 2015 WL 
648579 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). A divided Fifth Circuit panel then upheld the 
preliminary injunction, focusing on the categorical nature of the programs, the size of 
the pool of persons who might benefit, and the affirmative benefits that flow from the 
status of deferred action, in particular employment authorization. See Texas v. United 
States, 787 F.3d 733, 778, 794 (5th Cir. 2015). Pursuant to the laws or policies of 
some states, deferred action and/or federal employment authorization enables access 
to state drivers’ licenses, which is what the states asserted as their primary injury in 
the lawsuit. Id. When the government’s appeal reached the Court, the Court issued a 
one-sentence per curiam decision, which indicated that its eight members were 
equally divided, thereby affirming the lower court’s judgment (although without 
further precedential effect). See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
Subsequently, the Court rejected the administration’s motion for rehearing once a 
ninth Justice is confirmed, returning the matter to proceed in the District Court. See 
Petition for Rehearing, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (July 18, 2016) (No. 
15-674), 2016 WL 3902439, reh’g denied, (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.supremecourt. 
gov/orders/courtorders/100316zor_9ol1.pdf. 
 367 For a sample of recent scholarship arguing that the deferred action programs 
were constitutional, see MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 147; Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, 
supra note 29, at 104; Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in 
the Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 256 (2013); Kalhan, 
Deferred Action, supra note 83, at 85; Shoba S. Wadhia, The President and Deportation: 
DACA, DAPA, and the Sources and Limits of Executive Authority – Response to Hiroshi 
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with the constitutionality of DAPA and DACA in particular, instead 
focusing on the extent to which such efforts generally align with the 
Court’s recent deportation jurisprudence. 
Bracketing the question of their ultimate legality, it seems 
abundantly clear that the deferred action programs were an instance of 
equity-driven enforcement discretion, aimed at implementing some of 
the Department of Homeland Security’s proportionality concerns in 
the face of code stringency.368 In particular, the criteria for DACA — 
long-term residence in the United States, entering the country at a 
very young age, earning a high school diploma, lacking a criminal 
record and other “red-flag” markers of antisocial behavior — 
illustrates some of the inflexibility and harshness of the current code, 
which provides few formal mechanisms for such persons to one day 
regularize their immigration status.369 For those who qualified for 
DACA, entry or presence in the United States without authorization 
was the offense triggering the sanction of deportation and a ten-year 
bar on lawful return.370 Even so, the mitigating factors built in to the 
program’s criteria suggested at least significantly diminished personal 
culpability, strong community ties, assimilation as Americans, high 
potential for economic productivity, and no indications of criminality 
or dangerousness. The criteria for DAPA, which would have benefited 
the law-abiding, long-present parents of U.S. citizens or LPRs, also 
reflected the Obama administration’s concern with unjustly imposing 
 
Motomura, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 189, 192 (2015); Letter from 136 Law Professors and 
Scholars to President (Sept. 3, 2014), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Law-
Professor-Letter.pdf. For opposing scholarly views, see Robert J. Delahunty & John C. 
Yoo, Dream on: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the 
DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 785-77 (2013); Peter 
Margulies, Take Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial 
Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 106 (2014); Zachary S. 
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 680 (2014); 
Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism, supra note 69, at 84.  
 368 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 685-86, 694-98.  
 369 See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated Aug. 10, 2016).  
 370 See Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A)–(C) 
(2012) (providing that noncitizens who were inadmissible at the time of entry, or who 
are present in violation of the INA, or who fail to maintain or comply with the 
conditions of non-immigrant status, are deportable); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (setting 
forth a ten-year bar on reentry of noncitizens who are removed or who depart the 
United States after having resided without authorization for at least one year).  
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the life-altering penalty of deportation in light of certain noncitizens’ 
underlying conduct and personal circumstances.371 
These kinds of deferred action programs would exempt (at least 
temporarily) from enforcement deportable noncitizens who can point 
to highly sympathetic equities, focusing in particular on situations that 
implicate the well-being and diminished culpability of children. To be 
sure, the scale of those who might have benefited from DACA and 
DAPA combined — estimated at a combined five million, or nearly 
half the entire undocumented population — was fairly breathtaking.372 
In the view of some commentators, the categorical nature of the 
programs was at odds with traditional notions of individualized 
equity.373 Others countered that the deferred action programs’ design 
merely “relocate[d] discretion to a point higher up in the 
bureaucracy,”374 that low-level agents retained adequate discretionary 
power in evaluating DACA applicants,375 and that in any event the 
large number of potential beneficiaries simply reflected the fact that a 
large number of removable noncitizens in the United States have 
extremely sympathetic equities.376 Ultimately, the take-away for 
present purposes is that these efforts were driven by the Obama 
administration’s perceived need to exercise consistent discretion in 
immigration enforcement, rooted in equitable concerns about the 
proportionality of deportation. 
 
 371 See JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, SEC’Y U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED 
STATES AS CHILDREN AND WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE THE PARENTS 
OF U.S. CITIZENS OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf. The administration justified 
DAPA in part because American-born children will eventually be able to lawfully 
petition for their parents; therefore, offering prosecutorial discretion to the law-
abiding persons within that group would avoid unnecessary destruction of the family 
unit. See Brief for the Petitioners, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (Mar. 1, 
2016) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 836758, at *62. 
 372 See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-4.  
 373 See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 367, at 177; Michael W. McConnell, Opinion, 
Why Obama’s Immigration Order Was Blocked, WALL STREET J., Feb. 18, 2015, at A15; 
Zachary Price, Two Cheers for OLC’s Opinion, BALKANIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/two-cheers-for-olcs-opinion.html.  
 374 See Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 29, at 182; Kalhan, Deferred Action, 
supra note 83, at 90; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 205; Amanda Frost, When 
Two Wrongs Make a Right: Response to Hiroshi Motomura, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 101 
(2015). 
 375 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 695-96. 
 376 See id. at 696-98; Kalhan, Deferred Action, supra note 83, at 70, 92; see also 
MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 176.  
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In light of President-elect Donald Trump’s signaled end to the 
Obama administration’s deferred action initiatives, it is unlikely that 
Texas or associated litigation377 will return to the Court. Thus, the 
scope of the President’s authority to implement such equitable 
administrative efforts will remain uncertain for the time being. 
Arguably, however, such efforts are consistent with Arizona, where the 
Court acknowledged that federal enforcers may appropriately decline 
to enforce code law against deportable noncitizens, including as a 
result of general enforcement priorities. The Court did not predicate 
its preemption rulings on the necessity that enforcement discretion 
actually be exercised in any particular individual’s case. Indeed, the 
vast majority of those protected from state action by Arizona will have 
avoided federal enforcement as the result of macro-level enforcement 
policies and resource decisions, rather than due to any form of case-
by-case equitable balancing. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona 
explicitly recognized the connection between the majority’s 
endorsement of broad executive authority to under-enforce 
immigration law and the Obama administration’s then-recent 
announcement of DACA.378 
Further, the large body of deportation jurisprudence considered in this 
Article reflects the Court’s significant pushback, within its institutional 
constraints, against the most unfair applications of a deportation system 
lacking back-end proportionality review. The intended beneficiaries of 
DACA and DAPA would seem to have fit that bill.379 
C. Surrogates and Signals 
While proportionality concerns appear to underlie the modern 
Court’s deportation decisions, thus far the Court has been unwilling to 
 
 377 DACA-eligible noncitizens challenging the nationwide scope of the preliminary 
injunction in the Texas case have filed complaints in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Complaint, Lopez v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-09670 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2016); 
Complaint, Vidal v. Baron, No. 1:16-cv-04756 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016) 2016 WL 
4524062. 
 378 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for insulating from state interference the federal government’s 
failure “to enforce the immigration laws as written” and connecting DACA with the 
Court’s elevation of enforcement discretion to the status of law for purposes of 
preemption analysis). 
 379 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 698 (“Noncitizens 
who meet the criteria for these programs — law-abiding and productive childhood 
arrivals or parents of U.S. citizens or LPRs — are likely to be among the portion of the 
deportable population presenting the greatest normative challenge to the operation of 
the removal system.”). 
  
1104 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:1029 
invalidate substantive immigration laws or overturn individual 
outcomes on proportionality grounds. The categorical approach cases 
do mitigate the harshness of the aggravated felony provisions by 
rejecting broad interpretations of the criminal removal grounds.380 In 
this way, as a practical matter many of the cases do have a substantive, 
proportionality-enhancing effect.381 But for the most part the Court’s 
decisions rely on procedural and structural tools to inject the 
possibility of equitable balancing into the criminal justice and 
immigration enforcement systems.382 These procedural safeguards 
thus function as surrogates for, or enablers of, fairness and 
proportionality, rather than providing specific guidance about what 
might make any particular deportation unjust.383 
One possible consequence of the Court’s non-substantive approach 
in this regard is that the deportation system in the future could 
become even harsher and more inflexible.384 The rulings only tend to 
create conditions that make the exercise of equitable balancing more 
likely.385 Judicial review is limited to assessing whether procedural 
requirements were adhered to; the Court does not directly evaluate the 
substantive outcomes generated by equitable balancing.386 As a result, 
Congress could amend the INA to squelch equitable relief more 
 
 380 See Traum, supra note 126, at 525 (“In Leocal, the Court’s ‘ordinary’ and 
‘natural’ reading of the statute was not merely procedural, as it yielded a substantive 
result: it limited the scope of the aggravated felony definition and meant that a class of 
noncitizens would not be subject to permanent exile.”). 
 381 See id. at 530 (“As a result of Lopez and Carachuri-Rosendo, many low-level drug 
offenses do not qualify as aggravated felonies.”). 
 382 Of course, process is critical. See, e.g., Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Procedural fairness and regularity 
are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if 
they are fairly and impartially applied.”); Martinez, supra note 279, at 1026-27 
(discussing social science work showing that perceptions of fairness depend on 
process as well as substantive outcomes). However, well-designed procedure may also 
distract from failure to provide substantively fair outcomes. See generally id. 
 383 Cf. Koh, supra note 131, at 300 (arguing that the categorical approach “operates 
as a proxy for the availability of relief from deportation and corrects for the lack of 
proportionality in the laws”). 
 384 See, e.g., Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 77 
(“Congress, of course, could intervene to foreclose judicial review of motions to 
reopen, but has not yet done so.”).  
 385 Cf. Bowers, Baselines, supra note 17, at 1112-13 (discussing a similar 
phenomenon in the Court’s approach to criminal law plea-bargaining). 
 386 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001) (“Moreover, this case 
raises only a pure question of law as to respondent’s statutory eligibility for 
discretionary relief, not, as the dissent suggests, an objection to the manner in which 
discretion was exercised.”). 
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emphatically (for example, by making any criminal conviction an 
automatic basis for deportation), and the executive could throw 
discretionary enforcement leniency decisions to the wind.387 
The Court may have substantial reasons for declining to recognize a 
substantive proportionality right in this context. For example, the 
Court might wish to afford the political branches leeway to facilitate 
rapid deportation in particularly sensitive cases or in particularly 
exigent circumstances. The Court also may wish to avoid the flood of 
proportionality-based challenges to removal that would undoubtedly 
follow recognition of anything approaching a substantive right. And in 
any event, the Court’s approach to proportionality concerns in other 
areas of the law — most notably criminal law — is similarly heavy on 
process and light on substance.388 
Perhaps, then, the Court’s decisions in this area are best viewed as 
signals to the political branches that specific aspects of the system are 
in need of reform.389 In particular, the Court seems to be messaging, 
and with some urgency, that more room for individualized evaluation 
is critical for adequate protection of noncitizens’ interests when facing 
deportation. While the judiciary is not institutionally situated to create 
a humane deportation system, the Court can fire shots intended to jolt 
the political branches into the process of statutory or regulatory 
reform, if only piecemeal.390 After all, executive officials and 
 
 387 Even in that scenario, the Court might at least continue to police overtly 
discriminatory or arbitrary and capricious executive enforcement practices. See 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (observing that plaintiffs could 
bring an as-applied discriminatory challenge to the operation of SB 1070 in the 
future); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 481-82 (2011); Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 
471, 510-11 (1999); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 1657-58 (1985). But the 
Court’s reliance on procedural rather than substantive holdings puts it “in an 
institutionally weaker position to later strike down Congress’s fix on rights-based 
grounds.” Martinez, supra note 279, at 1030; see also id. at 1031 (arguing that 
procedural rulings can have negative impact on substantive rights because they allow 
rights violations to continue and foreclose rights-based challenges in the future 
without the merits ever being considered). 
 388 Cf. Bowers, Baselines, supra note 17 (“The Court has exercised a kind of quality 
control over the procedural mechanisms of ‘the machinery of criminal justice.’ But it 
consistently has refused to exercise quality control over the substantive penalties that 
plea bargains produce.”). 
 389 Cf. Martinez, supra note 279, at 1029 (“The Court’s [enemy combatant] 
decisions are less like landmarks and more like small signposts directing the traveller 
to continue toward an eventual, more significant fork in the road.”). 
 390 See Coenen, supra note 365, at 1366 (discussing inter-branch constitutional 
dialogue); see also Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court Matters in American 
Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives 63, 71-73, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Gillman & Clayton eds., 1999) 
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legislatures have duties to act constitutionally (and, arguably, 
proportionally), regardless of the judiciary’s willingness or ability to 
fully enforce these obligations.391 
Ideally, the Court’s deportation jurisprudence would stimulate 
Congress to amend the underlying rules, rolling back the breadth and 
severity of the removal grounds and detention, and rules returning 
broader adjudicative discretionary authority to immigration judges. 
These developments would decrease pressure on the executive to seek 
proportionality through unusual (and more controversial) measures, 
such as President Obama’s deferred action programs. As a result of 
political gridlock in this area, however, Congress has not been able to 
enact meaningful immigration reform for many years, despite many 
attempts.392 
If Congress is unwilling or unable to enact statutory amendments 
along these lines, the Court’s deportation cases suggest that executive 
officials must work harder to inject proportionality into the system 
through enforcement discretion and policy choices. In particular, the 
Court has tried to impart the message that immigration officials are 
taking too stringent a line with respect to noncitizens with criminal 
history, by pushing for over-expansive interpretations of the removal 
provisions and treating almost any conviction as an unchangeable 
mark of undesirability.393 Thus far, however, even direct rebukes from 
the Court have not stemmed the tide of cases challenging the 
executive’s aggressive approach to deporting longtime lawful 
permanent noncitizens with minor convictions.394 
 
(describing how the Court’s decisions can act as a catalyst for political action). 
 391 See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 84-92 (2004); Cade, Policing 
the Immigration Police, supra note 31, at 189-96; Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial 
Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor’s Role, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1591, 1591-92 (2014); 
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1189, 1225 (2006); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the 
Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 128–30 (1993).  
 392 See MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE 
9/11: UNDERSTANDING THE STALEMATE OVER COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 1 
(2011); Ryan Lizza, Getting to Maybe: Inside the Gang of Eight’s Immigration Deal, NEW 
YORKER (June 24, 2013). 
 393 See supra Part II.B.2; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Torres v. 
Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (No. 14-1096) (Scalia, J.: “I don’t understand. Your 
argument is we have to interpret this thing to be as expansive as possible?”); Cade, 
Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 700-02; Traum, supra note 126, at 528 
(arguing that the categorical approach cases “seem[] to caution against expansive 
interpretations”). 
 394 See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013) (noting that for 
“the third time in seven years” the Court has rejected immigration officials’ 
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CONCLUSION 
The decline of equity-based decision-making in regard to 
deportation has shaped the Court’s recent jurisprudence in this field. 
After a century of extreme deference to the political branches, the 
Court has increasingly scrutinized the modern deportation regime’s 
lack of equitable individuation, especially regarding noncitizens with 
criminal history. The cases appear to represent a comprehensive, 
institutional response to an underlying sea change in the statutory and 
enforcement background. 
But the Court’s procedural approach to regulating proportionality in 
the operation of the deportation system has many drawbacks. Because 
the Court has not recognized a substantive proportionality principle in 
this area, immigration law may continue to address equitable 
considerations in only an indirect and incomplete way through 
unusual (and often controversial) executive efforts and episodic 
ameliorative rulings handed down by the Court. If the Court intends 
the deportation cases to signal the political branches that specific 
reform is needed, thus far the message has not been received, or at 
least not acted upon. In the absence of significant legislative or 
executive changes in this area, we can expect the Court to continue to 
keep a steady diet of deportation cases on its docket, chipping away at 
the harshest edges of a system marked by insufficient consideration of 
justice and humanity. 
 
characterization of “a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance’”). 
